At the beginning of September in Berlin, during the annual conference of ambassadors, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced a plan for Germany’s military domination of Europe. He openly declared that from now on Berlin would be guided solely by its own interests. The imperial path for Germany to achieve a dominant political role on the Old Continent poses an obvious threat to our political and economic position, writes Piotr Grochmalski in Gazeta Polska. This was a clear message directed simultaneously to Moscow and Berlin.
President Karol Nawrocki, speaking at the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (ONZ), emphasized: “Bringing Russia to account must be our collective duty, and the perpetrators of all crimes must be judged. I hope that this will happen, and that we will not keep meeting for years to come, discussing the same issue.” But he also made an explicit link between the issue of German reparations for crimes against Poland and Putin’s actions against Ukraine. He firmly stated: “No wars, no wars, no wars, I stress, can ever be profitable for aggressors. Nations and states are entitled to full compensation, including from those who started World War II. Because if we want to build a community of democratic states, a united European Union, then we must agree that war cannot be economically profitable for any aggressor.”
Germany’s obsession returns
These words were spoken just 16 days after Chancellor Friedrich Merz shocked Europe with his presentation of Germany’s new expansionist doctrine. He had already announced a plan for Germany’s military domination of Europe. He openly declared that from now on Berlin would follow only its own interests. Merz presented this imperial plan for the Federal Republic of Germany (RFN) to achieve a dominant political role on the Old Continent on September 8 in Berlin during the annual conference of ambassadors.
As Anna Kwiatkowska, an analyst at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), notes: “The declaration of changes in foreign and security policy delivered by the Chancellor before the diplomatic corps must be treated as a powerful symbolic message sent both abroad and to his own country. (…) Merz’s message about ‘taking responsibility’ means setting an ambitious plan. Berlin does not yet possess adequate military capabilities or sufficient political legitimacy to play the leading role in European security.”
Germany is once again gripped by its characteristic obsession. The press is full of articles about the need to build a powerful army, and Merz persuaded 230 diplomats that from now on foreign policy is the first line of the front and more important than ever. He demanded effectiveness in strengthening Germany’s position. He stated that Germany must be more present and play a bigger role. “This is a responsibility that we, as the strongest economy on this continent, not only bear, but even assume upon ourselves, not out of pride or arrogance, but due to the responsibility arising from the geostrategic location of our country, which we must fulfill in our own interest, but also in the interest of our European neighbors and the entire European Union.”
From now on, the Chancellor’s order to the entire diplomatic machine of the RFN is pragmatism and focus on advancing German interests. Such a direction in Berlin is an obvious threat to our political and economic position. President Lech Kaczyński warned shortly before his death: “Our struggle in the Union is, in a sense, a fight for sovereignty against German policy.” He believed that the RFN’s strategic goal was to weaken Poland’s position. As he stressed: “The point is not to allow Poland to stand in Germany’s way to achieving the status of a global power.”
Anna Kwiatkowska notes that Merz is moving “toward an ambitious strategy of a global player, focused on advancing its own interests.” He assigns Germany a leading, dominant role in Europe. At the same time, according to Kwiatkowska, “he cuts himself off from Germany’s previous moral-universalist language as a ‘civilian power’, describing that approach as ‘moral arrogance’ born of economic success, and calls for hard realism. Alongside declarative multilateralism, we see the language of national interest, strategic partnerships, and assertive shaping of the international order according to norms and rules. A novelty in this doctrine is also the strong emphasis on economic sovereignty as a political instrument. Germany is not only to diversify sources of raw materials and supply chains, but also to actively create a new global trading system independent of dysfunctional institutions such as the WTO. Combined with global ambitions and a redefinition of partnerships beyond the West – from Mercosur to Central Asia and Africa – emerges the image of Germany as a state not only participating in the international system, but also aspiring to reshape it in the spirit of its own interests and values.”
The dangerous dream of power
Merz presents himself as Europe’s defender, who will act effectively thanks to Berlin’s efficiency. As Kwiatkowska emphasizes: “He calls for ‘adapting’ European policy to the new role of the US in the world, pointing to the decreasing certainty of the transatlantic partnership. This emancipatory rhetoric reveals the gap between Berlin’s growing ambitions and its real capabilities. The idea of creating a ‘new, permanent security architecture’ and treating China as a systemic rival while simultaneously pursuing a policy toward it based on the interests of German industrial corporations remains internally contradictory and strategically unconvincing. Merz’s speech also points to other tensions: Berlin avoids precisely defining to what extent it is ready to share power with European partners. It is significant that there is no proposal for reforming the EU and improving its functioning.”
In reality, in the alleged interest of Europe, it is the strengthening of Germany that is supposed to strengthen the EU. The problem is that Berlin’s reckless projects have already caused a dramatic reduction in the Union’s economic potential. And the green madness is still being pushed, even though it leads to the impoverishment of millions of Europeans.
But Kwiatkowska also points to enormous threats to Poland arising from Merz’s announced doctrine. She warns: “Poland remains outside the main framework of the new German strategy. Merz’s speech sends an ambiguous signal. On one hand, strong anti-Putin rhetoric and declarations about the need to strengthen NATO’s European pillar could suggest greater convergence of German and Polish interests. On the other hand, Merz’s complete omission of Poland as a strategic partner is striking. In his speech, he repeatedly emphasizes the special role of France (as ‘the heart chamber of Europe’) and the United Kingdom as key allies. He also points to the priority of building relations with the countries of the Global South – from Brazil to Central Asia. Poland does not appear either as a partner in building a new international order or as a point of reference in thinking about the security of NATO’s eastern flank. This is all the more significant as during the election campaign Merz had suggested a willingness to rebuild trust in relations with Warsaw and to better appreciate Poland’s role in the region. As a result, Warsaw is absent from Merz’s speech as an equal partner.”
How Germany turned to Moscow
Konrad Adenauer, when he became the first Chancellor of Germany in 1949 after World War II, was 73 years old. It seemed that due to his age he would play only a minor role in European politics. Yet he led the RFN for 14 years. When he lost power at the age of 87, he left behind a political testament, formulated during the Suez Crisis when the USA forced the UK and France to withdraw from the conflict. He stated: “France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States or the Soviet Union. The same applies to Germany. This leaves them only one path to play a decisive role in the world – and that is the path to a united Europe.”
But in pursuing this goal, he relied on close cooperation with the USA. However, Chancellor Willy Brandt broke this logic, recognizing relations with Moscow as strategically most important in 1969. As Henry Kissinger notes in his seminal work Diplomacy: “Brandt came out with a bold thesis for the time, that since attempts to unify Germany with the help of the West had ended in stalemate, one should seek unification through rapprochement with the communist camp.” This was a powerful blow to NATO cohesion. As Kissinger emphasizes: “(…) any crisis arising from Germany’s insistence on its national aspirations (…) posed a potential threat to the unity of the Western Alliance (…). German policy toward the Atlantic Alliance began to collapse. Nixon [US president – note P.G.] and his advisers had to accept Ostpolitik to some extent. (…) However, if Germany, the country with the greatest economic potential in Europe, and simultaneously the country with the most territorial claims, attempted to change the postwar order, the consequences would be extremely serious. When Brandt revealed intentions to act independently in the East, the Nixon administration concluded that it would be better to support him, because any attempt to oppose him could risk loosening the Federal Republic’s ties to NATO and the Common Market.”
The German elites knew that German reunification would make them politically strong enough to dominate the Union and use it as an instrument of Berlin’s global ambitions.
Germany’s imperial obsession
The last time such a working meeting with the full diplomatic corps of the RFN took place was in 2000 with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who initiated a project of geopolitical cooperation with Putin that Angela Merkel later inherited. These ambitions led to the construction of two pipelines across the Baltic Sea, intended to impose an energy diktat of Moscow and Berlin on Central Europe. Based on this, a new division of Europe was to be built. Schroeder’s 2000 meeting with German ambassadors revealed elements of Berlin’s new imperial strategy. But the contours of this project were sketched earlier by the then-Foreign Minister of the RFN Joschka Fischer, who on May 12, 2000, at Humboldt University in Berlin presented a vision of a united Europe based on a constitution that would strengthen Berlin’s position.
Today, the German elites are experiencing a revival of this imperial obsession. Merz’s doctrine includes a major plan for the militarization of the RFN. In this spirit, Claudia Major and Christian Mölling openly declared that Germany is finally ready to assume continental leadership. These influential German analysts, in the European Policy Centre, presented Berlin’s path to becoming a military power. They claim that Germany has no choice, as others push them into the role of European hegemon. As they emphasize: “Within weeks, Germany rejected its constitutional dogmas and accepted the leadership role it once refused. Whether this marks the beginning of a lasting transformation depends not only on Berlin. France, the United Kingdom, and other European states must adjust their capacities and ambitions to Germany’s new direction. Germany itself must do more than just allocate money – it must reform its environment, achieve results, restore credibility, and cultivate a culture of strategic approach. The European security order is being transformed, not because of grand plans, but out of necessity. In this fragile transformation, Germany’s decisions will have more impact than in the past decades. Strong Germany enables a strong Europe and strong European defense. Meanwhile, indecisive and weak Germany weakens the rest of Europe. The country is no longer on strategic vacation. It is moving – slowly, cautiously – toward responsibility. The rest of Europe would do well to support it and keep pace.”
Germany’s historical amnesia
Germany is once again succumbing to a dangerous wave of radicalism whose consequences led to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Had it not been for their extremely irresponsible geopolitical axis with Putin, Europe would not be facing a deep crisis today. Once again, Poland may become the main victim of German imperial ambitions. They have not learned their lesson, have forgotten the consequences of their policies, and still do not feel material responsibility for crimes against the Polish nation.
Goebbels writes in his diary on September 20, 1939: “Winkler is now organizing the Polish economy. This will be huge work. Everything should first be transformed into German state property. And then we will see.” And in the entry of October 3, 1939, he notes: “At the press conference I once again take the position not to glorify the Polish nation and to rid ourselves of sentimental attachment to it. We must not create any martyrs and must also allow this. The national history of this nation must come to an end. Our propaganda must focus on this.” On November 2, 1939, he records observations from the occupied territories: “Driving through Polish streets. This is already Asia. We will have a lot of work to Germanize this area. Long discussion with my people. It becomes clear how we must proceed. Radically against Poles and with the greatest protection of Germanness. (…) Warsaw: this is hell. Destroyed city. Our bombs and grenades have done their job. No house is left intact. The population is apathetic and ghost-like. Creeping along streets like vermin. It is disgusting and indescribable. At the citadel. (…) Here Polish nationalism suffered. We must completely eradicate it, or one day it will rise again. (…) Visit to Belweder Palace. Here the Polish marshal [Piłsudski] lived and worked. (…) Here one can understand what is at stake if the Polish intelligentsia gets the chance to spread its wings.”
Have the Germans forgotten?
The Bundeswehr has existed only since 1955, but it was preceded by the Nazi Wehrmacht (1935–1945), the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic (1919–1935), and the Imperial German Army. All “contributed” to anti-Polish policies. After Germany’s defeat in World War II, the USA and its allies dissolved the Wehrmacht, which had played a significant role in genocide. German uniforms and military symbols were banned. Under “denazification”, the occupied state was forbidden from having any army. Politics then reversed reality. The escalation of the Cold War, and later in 1950, North Korea’s aggression against South Korea, led Washington to change its stance. The USA pressured NATO partners to rearm West Germany and integrate it into the Alliance. Konrad Adenauer, the first postwar Chancellor of Germany, saw this as a unique opportunity. Just five years after World War II, on November 12, 1955, the first 100 volunteers joined the newly created Bundeswehr. The new army also welcomed former Hitler soldiers. An obvious lie was invented to conceal this fact. Adenauer declared in 1952 that anyone who had fought “honorably” in the Wehrmacht – i.e., those who committed no war crimes – would find a place in the new army.
Thus, Major Bernd Freytag von Loringhoven, last adjutant of Hitler who, on the personal order of the Third Reich leader, left the bunker in Berlin just before Hitler’s suicide, joined the Bundeswehr and became a general. His son, Arnd Freytag von Loringhofen, thanks to the legend surrounding his father, became deputy head of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and from 2016 to 2020 was Deputy Secretary General of NATO for Intelligence and Security. Later, Merkel sent him to Poland as ambassador to support the pro-German opposition. Thousands of former Wehrmacht soldiers, who had participated in brutal murders of Poles, joined the Bundeswehr. Today, as German publications are filled with articles on the military revival of the RFN, this topic is generally omitted.
Deceit to the core
In an extensive article in Politico by Jessica Baterman, “Germany’s Army is Rebuilding. What Could Go Wrong?”, published on August 29, 2025, the journalist quotes Thorsten Loch, a Bundeswehr officer and military historian, who comments on the personnel selection mechanism introduced by Adenauer: “The effectiveness of this ‘self-cleansing’ is disputed.” Despite extensive literature showing Wehrmacht involvement in civilian massacres, Germans still believe in its purity. As Loch states: “Only a small number of Wehrmacht officers were ever tried for war crimes, and the concept of ‘honorable’ soldiers led to what many perceive as whitewashing of the Nazi-era army, often called ‘the myth of the clean Wehrmacht’. The narrative arose that it was the Nazi Party, not Wehrmacht soldiers, that committed atrocities. Of course, this is not true, as the reality is more complicated. Some of the first Bundeswehr officers still do not understand what they did during World War II. The first Chief of Operations was Lieutenant Colonel Karl-Theodor Molinari, who resigned in 1970 when it emerged that he might have been involved in the shooting of 105 French resistance soldiers, though the charges were never proven. And although every effort was made to remove the most obvious signs, symbols, and rituals of the Wehrmacht, some remained.”
Only in 2005 was the first exhibition opened in Berlin showing Wehrmacht crimes committed in Poland. But it did little to change Germans’ perception of murders by German soldiers. This process of RFN militarization and the creation of the EU’s largest army, while still living in deep lies, must be taken seriously. A striking symbol of this lie is Germany’s hysterical and aggressive stance on our demands for World War II reparations.