First, let us examine some recent data that will help to better understand the context of the discussion. The Central Statistical Office has just reported that industrial production in Poland fell by 1% year-on-year in January. This is worse than analysts had forecasted. Even more concerning is the decline in export sectors, including the automotive industry. This bodes ill for companies, employees, and the state budget. Furthermore, the Central Statistical Office states that the average wage in the enterprise sector in January 2025 saw the smallest increase in over three years (9.2% year-on-year). Meanwhile, employment has dropped by almost one percent in the past year. Analysts from Pekao Bank explained on X that this decline is partly due to the annual change in the sample of surveyed enterprises by the Central Statistical Office. However, they explicitly stated: “A tough start to the year for the domestic labour market.”
Increasingly Difficult Times
Another issue is that Donald Tusk’s government has no intention of raising the tax-free amount or PIT thresholds. It is seeking revenue for the state budget. As always, liberals are doing this at the expense of the less affluent: even those earning the minimum wage now have to pay PIT. Meanwhile—surprise!—Poland is again experiencing a significant decline in VAT revenue related to preparatory proceedings for fraud and carousel schemes in tax crime cases. The National Revenue Administration has issued a warning that this revenue has fallen from 3 billion to 1.8 billion PLN. Only a blind person would fail to notice the pattern: someone is evidently repaying dishonest businesses for their political success.
For Polish workers, increasingly difficult times lie ahead, while the authorities once again allow VAT mafias to operate unchecked and instead prefer to seek money in the pockets of the less wealthy. All this is happening at a time when ever-growing portions of the budget must be allocated to defence, which extends far beyond strictly military aspects. The pathologies of the Third Republic of Poland (III RP) are returning at full speed; the creeping shock therapy is accelerating, though it is still just a jog. The real danger will emerge when Brussels implements the migration pact, which is primarily designed to serve German interests. The trend is clear: Merkel’s migration policy has been a total failure, seriously undermining trust in the German establishment over the past decade. Particularly outraged are Germans from the east—still wealthier than Poles but visibly envious of the peace and security found on Polish streets, promenades, parks, and beaches. A few months ago, I spoke in English with an elderly German couple on a beach between Świnoujście and Ahlbeck. They visit Poland not only because it is cheaper but also because they feel much safer. And they would prefer to feel the same way at home.
Germany Will Dump the Consequences of Merkel’s Policies on Poland
One does not need to be a genius in migration policy or international relations to draw obvious conclusions. These are Poland’s realities on the eve of the implementation of the migration pact. Germans, not only from Brandenburg, are eager to push east of the Oder all the “engineers” and “doctors” that Angela Merkel, in a fit of madness, sought to inject into the German economy. Poland, under the rule of the United Right, fiercely opposed such ideas in the name of a well-understood national self-interest and was placed under scrutiny for it. But previous governments bought us time, hoping that society would remain wary of liberals and the left, who for years have endorsed Berlin and Brussels’ migration policies.
Fools are not born; they are made. The “solemnly annulled” referendum on migration, cancelled by Donald Tusk, was met with wild laughter not only among the so-called elites of the Third Republic. Tusk was applauded by people from Poland’s western regions. Today, they are beginning to rub their eyes in disbelief as German authorities increasingly blatantly drop unwanted guests from Africa and Asia onto Polish territory. There is no longer any doubt that the migration wave has been postponed until after the Polish presidential elections. When that moment comes, the Belarusian-Russian “Sluice” operation will seem like a minor inconvenience. The migration surge from the West—considered fully legal yet enforced under pressure from our neighbours and the rapidly shifting political realities there—could significantly exacerbate Poland’s social and economic problems.
Perhaps some entrepreneurs are already celebrating the influx of cheap labour, hoping it will allow them to exert downward pressure on Polish wages. But what happens when an employed gentleman starts brandishing a knife in a factory or, as a waiter, stabs a guest in the eye with a fork? Someone might protest, saying such incidents would remain isolated. Yet, the experience of many Western countries shows how “isolated incidents” transform into a permanent feature. Even without such extreme cases, considering Poland’s deficient housing and social policies—policies that have essentially depended on the reforms introduced by PiS in 2016 despite liberal and leftist outcries—ordinary citizens will have to compete with an ever-growing number of migrants for housing, jobs, and wages. What impact will this have on social sentiment? How will it affect Poland’s demographics? Which political forces will benefit from such a situation? Where will Donald Tusk and Rafał Trzaskowski (if he becomes president) flee when things spiral out of control? How large a military and police cordon will they need to shield themselves from rising social anger? They are not thinking about this now—only about consolidating power over Poland. But over time, they will pay an increasingly high price for it. Blaming the opposition will not help. Unfortunately, much of Polish society still naively believes that the December 13 coalition is the best political response to our current problems. As if politics followed the drunken, pseudo-medical logic of “curing like with like.”
The Migration Pact at the Worst Possible Moment
One final, crucial point: the shifting geopolitical situation requires Poland not only to increase spending on the military, armaments, and defence infrastructure but also to maintain social cohesion as the foundation for civil defence, sanitary and protective infrastructure (hospitals and shelters), and well-paid, well-functioning public services. These have been long-standing issues in Poland, as the Third Republic was built on the principle that “the market is always right.” Under the pressure of migration, which will demand significant financial resources, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where the police are unable to control crime among migrants who are wreaking havoc in local communities. We are already experiencing staffing shortages in many public services. How will this situation evolve when more strong, able-bodied men are needed for national defence? What will life in Polish cities and towns look like when the migration wave becomes increasingly unmanageable?
Even in the West, there is growing scepticism about whether placing migrants in modern, comfortable facilities solves any problems. The scale of the phenomenon is too vast for such social engineering to have an integrating—or even stabilizing—effect. This is especially true given the chronic shortage of social workers, a profession long undervalued in Poland. The rise in frustration and social hostility will have dire consequences, including internationally. One can easily envision Russian provocations in hybrid warfare—attempts to incite riots, or even, God forbid, lynchings in response to migrant-perpetrated crimes.
One can bury their head in the sand and pretend nothing will happen. But if social anger toward migrants becomes the dominant emotion, Poland will face a serious crisis.
The current government has no interest in discussing these issues. The opposition treats it as political fuel. This is understandable, but the impending migration crisis will make Polish politics increasingly unpredictable. And it remains uncertain who will ultimately benefit from this chaos. This is not fatalism—it is a reality we must now reckon with.