Washington has taken decisive action against the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. U.S. forces carried out an operation in which the president of Venezuela and his wife were captured. According to J. Michael Waller, a strategy analyst at the Center for Security Policy, this move could have far-reaching and largely overlooked consequences that extend well beyond Latin America—striking at China’s strategic interests and potentially preventing an invasion of Taiwan.
J. Michael Waller, who is also president of Georgetown Research, a political-risk and private intelligence firm, presented his analysis in a series of posts on the X platform. He argues that actions by President Trump’s administration in Venezuela, combined with support for the Iranian opposition, could effectively derail the plans of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Beijing’s oil Achilles’ heel
A key element of Waller’s analysis is China’s dependence on oil imports from countries that are not subject to pressure from the United States. As the expert emphasizes, “Beijing needs oil that is not exposed to U.S. pressure. That means Russia, Venezuela, and Iran.” Waller claims that China was purchasing “60–90% of Venezuelan and 85–90% of Iranian crude oil,” which accounted for “30–35% of China’s current oil imports.”
Data from late 2025 appear to partially support these claims. According to one report, in October 2025, 41% of China’s oil imports came collectively from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, with Iran accounting for 23.3%, Russia for 11%, and Venezuela for 6.7% of total imports. Another source states that as much as 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. Waller adds that a further “approximately 35% of China’s oil comes from Arab suppliers who are subject to U.S. guidelines or pressure.”
As a result, through a potential change of power in Venezuela and Iran, the United States would gain the ability to “regulate up to 70% of the CCP’s current oil needs.” Under such conditions, Waller argues, “CCP war planners cannot carry out an execution in Taiwan.” This action would “relieve pressure on the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region for some time, benefiting America’s NATO commitments in Europe.”
Geopolitical dominoes: from Taiwan to Latin America
Waller expands on his argument by pointing to a series of potential “consequences of Trump’s actions in Venezuela.” First, there is the “possible disruption of China’s plans to invade Taiwan and seize control of its cutting-edge AI chip production.”
Second, the U.S. intervention represents “a massive failure of China’s strategy to dominate Latin America.” In recent years, Beijing has systematically expanded its influence in the region. In December 2025, China published its third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, outlining a strategy to deepen engagement and secure support for its geopolitical objectives, including in advanced technologies and military cooperation.
Third, the operation in Venezuela means “a loss of face for Xi Jinping—who cannot afford to appear weak—amid the military purge he is conducting.” Numerous sources from late 2025 and early 2026 confirm that large-scale purges have been underway for months within the Chinese military, removing high-ranking officers, including successive defense ministers. Such internal instability, combined with a setback on the international stage, could weaken the Chinese leader’s position.
A blow to Moscow’s interests
Waller also lists other significant effects of the American strike—important from Poland’s perspective—that are negative for Moscow. These include:
- blocking China’s access to “Venezuelan oil at deeply discounted prices,” giving Beijing “greater leverage to demand bigger discounts from Russia and making the war in Ukraine more costly [for Moscow]”;
- strengthening “America’s ability to fulfill its treaty obligations abroad”;
- an “intelligence bonanza emerging from Venezuela regarding corruption in political systems worldwide and at home.”