On a symbolic level, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) served as proof that after the collapse of the USSR, Russia retained the ability to shape and lead the region. Therefore, the gradual withdrawal of countries from this union is perceived by the Kremlin as a serious blow to its prestige, comments Radu Burduja in an interview with Niezalezna.pl. Burduja is a former deputy defense minister of Moldova, a former representative of Moldova to NATO and the EU, and the director of the Euro-Atlantic Institute for Consolidation and Stability in Chișinău. Will the next step be the unification of Moldova with Romania?
Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mihai Popșoi, has just announced that his country is taking steps toward formally withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). How would you explain to Polish readers what the CIS means for Russia’s prestige, and what Moldova’s departure from this organization will mean for Moscow?
For the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remained for decades more of a political and symbolic instrument than an economic one—a way to maintain the status of a regional “center of power” in the post-Soviet space. The legal withdrawal of the Republic of Moldova from the CIS undermines this construct and limits Moscow’s institutional capacity to expand its influence in the so-called “near abroad” (a term used to describe former Soviet states bordering Russia).
On a symbolic level, the CIS was evidence that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia preserved its ability to shape and lead the region. That is why the gradual withdrawal of states—especially those openly oriented toward European integration—is perceived by the Kremlin as a serious blow to its prestige. It shows that integration projects under Russian auspices are losing their appeal, and that the geopolitical center of gravity is shifting toward the European Union.
From an institutional perspective, the CIS provided Moscow with influence at minimal cost—through interstate commissions, framework agreements, administrative networks, technical cooperation, and negotiation mechanisms that could also be used to exert political pressure. The announcement by Moldova’s foreign minister, Mihai Popșoi, of the denunciation of three fundamental documents (the 1991 Agreement Establishing the CIS, its annexes, and the 1993 CIS Charter) signifies not only a factual distancing, but also a full de jure withdrawal—that is, the removal of the legal basis for membership.
For Moscow, this means the loss of an important element of legitimacy and a formal argument for keeping Moldova within its sphere of influence. The Kremlin’s likely response will be an intensification of indirect pressure: information campaigns, rhetoric about a “break with historical roots,” support for pro-Russian political forces within the country, and at times also economic or energy pressure. At the same time, Chișinău has made it clear that it intends to continue developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, but without the CIS umbrella, which significantly limits Russia’s ability to use this platform as a tool of influence.
For the European Union and its Western partners, Moldova’s move confirms a lasting strategic trend: the gradual dismantling of post-Soviet dependencies and the consolidation of the country within the European political and economic space. For Russia, Moldova’s exit from the CIS is not merely a formal issue, but a sign of declining institutional influence and the definitive shift of geopolitical rivalry to the EU–Russia level.
What did CIS membership mean for Moldova itself, and what will it gain from leaving?
For the Republic of Moldova, the CIS gradually lost its practical significance. Trade indicators clearly show that the European Union has become the decisive economic partner, while the share of the CIS—and Russia in particular—has fallen to a marginal level. Under these circumstances, leaving the CIS entails minimal economic costs and strengthens the strategic coherence of the country’s foreign policy.
In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the CIS served as a transitional framework for Moldova, providing basic trade rules, sectoral agreements (in transport, technical cooperation, and standards), and relatively predictable relations with post-Soviet states. Over time, however, the practical value of this format diminished. Since 2023, Moldova has effectively suspended its participation in CIS bodies and has begun a gradual withdrawal from agreements, citing the lack of real benefits within a structure politically dominated by Russia.
Official statistics confirm a sharp decline in the CIS’s economic role. In 2024, Moldova’s exports to the EU amounted to USD 2.39 billion (67.3 percent of total exports), while imports from the EU reached USD 4.55 billion (50.2 percent of total imports). By comparison, exports to CIS countries totaled just USD 241.6 million (6.8 percent), and imports from the CIS USD 346.3 million (3.8 percent). Thus, the EU is roughly ten times more important than the CIS for Moldovan exports. Moreover, in the period from January to August 2025, exports to CIS countries fell by a further 19.2 percent and imports by 11.5 percent compared to the same period of the previous year, indicating a continuing trend toward trade decline.
The benefits of aligning with EU requirements are systemic in nature. They include access to the single market through the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area—part of the Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova), the implementation of European standards, increased investment, financial support, and institutional strengthening. By contrast, the CIS area is now associated with high political risk, sanctions-related constraints, logistical disruptions, and the politicization of trade. Russia’s repeated embargoes on Moldovan agricultural products—also during periods when Moldova was still a CIS member—are telling and point to the limited value of this format as a mechanism of economic protection.
Leaving the CIS does not mean breaking bilateral relations with countries in the region, but rather rejecting outdated and politically overburdened institutional frameworks. Economic data clearly show that Moldova’s future lies in the European Union, while the CIS has lost its strategic significance. In this sense, the legal withdrawal from the CIS merely formalizes an already existing reality.
On the Romanian side, the official position was recently reaffirmed by President Nicușor Dan. He emphasized that Bucharest fully respects the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova and that any decision on possible unification can only be taken by Moldovan citizens through a democratic process. At the same time, Romania continues to provide comprehensive support for Moldova’s European integration, the development of bilateral cooperation, and the implementation of joint projects that bring the two states closer economically, institutionally, and socially. Romania’s approach remains supportive rather than prescriptive.
In the absence of a formal initiative—whether in the form of a proposed referendum, a political timetable, or intergovernmental negotiations—the most logical scenario remains the deepening of de facto integration: energy and infrastructure interconnections, institutional cooperation, joint projects in education, security, and public administration, as well as consistent support for Moldova’s European path. These processes are already largely underway and are gradually accelerating, reducing internal political risk and increasing Moldova’s structural compatibility with Romania and the EU.
At the same time, external reactions remain tense. Moscow has already criticized the idea of unification, describing it as a threat to the “statehood” of the Republic of Moldova, which points to a high risk of the Kremlin resorting to hybrid influence and attempts to destabilize Moldova.
In the short term, statements by the leaders of Moldova and Romania constitute a strategic signal in the context of deteriorating regional security, but they do not mean the immediate launch of a formal process. In practice, the most likely scenario remains accelerated rapprochement through European integration and bilateral Romanian-Moldovan projects. Only the achievement of a decisive majority and the creation of a clear legal framework could move this issue from political rhetoric to institutional solutions.