President Karol Nawrocki and the President of the National Bank of Poland, Adam Glapiński, have presented a groundbreaking initiative called the “Polish SEJF 0%”, which—according to many indications—could become not only a powerful but also a secure alternative to the European Union’s loan program.
How could funds for military spending be legally released without violating the Polish Constitution and without reducing reserves, as the opposition allegedly claims the bank is doing? The details were outlined by the president’s social adviser Leszek Skiba (CEO of Bank Pekao from 2020–2024 and previously Deputy Minister of Finance). He explained the potential implementation of the “Polish SEJF” mechanism, which would involve paying out profits from the revaluation of the NBP’s gold reserves, in two possible variants.
President Nawrocki and the head of the National Bank of Poland, Adam Glapiński, presented the concept of “Polish SEJF 0%.” The initiative is intended to guarantee PLN 185 billion for armaments and serve as a direct domestic alternative to the European SAFE program.
The latter, although strongly promoted by the governing coalition, would in practice involve taking on a massive loan of approximately €43.7 billion, which Poles would be repaying until 2070.
The EU instrument also carries the risk of falling into a dangerous conditionality mechanism—a topic widely discussed in previous reporting. SAFE has also sparked serious controversy over potential beneficiaries of the funds (including the company Polska Amunicja, associated with former Civic Platform politician Paweł Poncyljusz) and raises concerns about possible geopolitical repercussions.
The EU framework could favor German defense corporations such as Rheinmetall, potentially weakening key transatlantic security ties important for Poland.
The presidential initiative showed that a different path is possible. Funds from the National Bank of Poland—according to Karol Nawrocki—“would not involve taking on credit or dependence on changes in the EU, and would provide the flexibility the Polish Armed Forces need when selecting equipment.”
However, the project quickly provoked a nervous reaction from the ruling camp. Prime Minister Donald Tusk rejected the proposal outright, stating: “There is no time for maneuvering here—please immediately sign the SAFE legislation.”
Tusk’s Demagoguery
A key myth repeated by the government is the claim that the NBP has suffered enormous losses amounting to PLN 60 or even PLN 100 billion.
In reality, the “loss” reported by the National Bank of Poland is largely purely accounting-based. This paper deficit primarily results from the appreciation of the Polish złoty (PLN) against foreign currencies.
Because the złoty has strengthened, foreign currency reserves held in dollars or euros appear lower in value when converted into Poland’s currency in accounting terms. In other words, a balance-sheet loss is created, but the Polish state has not actually lost a single physical dollar, euro, or ounce of gold.
To emphasize: the foreign exchange reserves remain physically untouched. The NBP invests them in safe instruments (such as government bonds issued by the United States or the EU), which generate positive investment returns, while the appreciation of the złoty produces negative exchange-rate differences in accounting.
It is worth noting that Poland possesses a powerful financial buffer—reserves approaching one trillion złoty, including over 550 tons of gold.
Over the past 30 months alone, active management of these reserves has generated revenues of approximately 180 billion złoty. As a result, the NBP holds massive unrealized gains from the valuation of gold, whose global market price has risen significantly during Adam Glapiński’s tenure.
The main challenge is that transferring these funds to the state budget under the current legal framework would require changes to the central bank’s accounting rules or the physical sale of part of the reserves, which would require consensus between different centers of political authority.
The President’s Adviser Explains
So how could these funds be legally released for armaments without violating the Constitution or reducing reserves, as the opposition claims?
The details were explained by presidential adviser Leszek Skiba, who described two potential variants for implementing the “Polish SEJF” mechanism, based on paying out profits from the revaluation of gold.
The first option assumes the physical sale of part of the gold at the current, very high market price, followed by its immediate repurchase using foreign exchange reserves.
This operation would ensure that the amount of gold in the state treasury remains unchanged, while generating a significant real cash profit—in the first stage amounting to tens of billions of złoty (potentially around 60 billion złoty).
The second option involves an “accounting revaluation”, which would require a so-called accompanying law.
This would allow the positive valuation of the precious metal to be transferred directly to the financial result of the National Bank of Poland, which—under existing law—would immediately supply the Armed Forces Support Fund.