From Donald Tusk’s pre-election declarations about Donald Trump’s “proven ties to intelligence agencies,” through provocations by Minister Sikorski and the appointment of Bogdan Klich, to explicit statements from coalition politicians that “pro-Europeanism” is to replace “pro-Americanism,” and the announced closer cooperation with France on security matters. These are no longer just gaffes or incompetence. This is a plan aimed at pushing the United States out of Europe, and it could have catastrophic consequences for Poland’s security.
On Michał Rachoń’s program on TV Republika, Dr. Piotr Kusznieruk, a politician from the New Left and head of the party’s Podlaskie structures, made statements that directly and unequivocally revealed Donald Tusk’s government’s plan concerning security policy. Whether Kusznieruk spoke recklessly and said too much, or whether it was a deliberately launched trial balloon by the government itself, is beside the point. What matters is the content.
“Economic acceleration and pro-Europeanism. More pro-Europeanism than pro-Americanism, that is, building a vision of Poland based on close cooperation with the European Union rather than transatlantic cooperation,” the politician stated. Importantly, this was in response to a question about the “one key guiding idea” driving the ruling coalition. When host Michał Rachoń pointed out that transatlantic cooperation means NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kusznieruk left no room for doubt, responding briefly: “That too.”
French Dreams
This statement should be considered alongside the increasingly frequent unofficial reports that French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to deliver the keynote address at the upcoming Warsaw Security Summit in September. Macron is reportedly set to announce increased French involvement in European security matters and a deepening of Franco-Polish cooperation on this front. There is even talk that part of his address will include a declaration of the permanent presence of French troops in eastern Poland.
It is no great secret why such a plan seems to offer nothing but advantages for both President Macron and Prime Minister Tusk. Macron, for his part, is doing everything he can, under the pretext of the war in Ukraine and in response to the transactional approach of the Trump administration, to once again breathe life into his dream of “strategic autonomy.” In fact, Dr. Kusznieruk’s entire statement could be summarized with the caption: “The Strategic Thinking of Emmanuel Macron – A Choice.”
In 2017, Macron stated at the Sorbonne that Europe must possess “the capacity for autonomous action.” In 2018, he declared, “Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its security. It is up to us to guarantee our own security.” A year later, in an interview, he famously pronounced “the brain death of NATO” and reiterated, “European countries can no longer depend on America to defend NATO allies.”
The war in Ukraine and the sluggish response of Western European capitals proved that all these declarations amounted to wishful thinking, luxuries affordable to a politician shielded from the Russian threat by a comfortable buffer zone. When it became clear that the only real power capable of supporting Kyiv against the invader remained the United States, Macron briefly backtracked. He even stated that his comments about NATO’s “brain death” were meant to provoke debate and strengthen the alliance.
But once the perception of French and German inaction regarding Ukraine began to fade, the French president returned to his favorite themes. “A great trap for Europe is that it will be drawn into crises that are not ours, preventing us from building strategic autonomy,” he said in 2023. “We must ensure that Europe is able to defend itself,” he declared in an address delivered in March 2025. “The future of Europe will not be decided by Russia or Washington,” he added.
One thing is worth remembering: these two elements, Europe taking defense more seriously and “freeing itself” from dependence on the United States, are always interconnected in Macron’s thinking. On this matter, he is the heir to the entire postwar French tradition. His Polish apologists and admirers of the “European army” concept always cleverly conceal the second element behind the first. What could be wrong with France taking responsibility, calling for greater investment in the arms industry, wanting to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to other countries, or contemplating sending “peacekeeping” forces to Ukraine? After all, that’s precisely what Warsaw had been demanding since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Yes, but that second, anti-American element could turn this proposal into an existential threat to Poland. Because Paris has more time than we do. One could even say that, in the event of successfully pushing the U.S. out of Europe, a war initiated by Russia on NATO’s eastern flank would be the best possible argument for why Macron’s vision must be implemented immediately.
What Are They Capable Of?
When defense analysts are asked about France’s actual ability to “project power,” they often respond with euphemisms such as, “It’s still a matter of the future.” But this isn’t really a euphemism, it’s more of a “noble lie.” Because how can something still be “a matter of the future” when it’s been discussed consistently for decades, yet has just as consistently failed to materialize? Just like “strategic autonomy,” the narrative of the “United States of Europe”, a European empire to rival the U.S. and other powers, is a fantasy of the future that will never arrive. Anyone who observes how Europe’s GDP is not catching up with the U.S., but is in fact shrinking in proportion to it, understands this is a future that will never come. And those who believe in such a future, such “eternal never”, are dangerous.
Just as those who want to replace transatlantic ties with “pro-Europeanism” are reckless charlatans who may steer Poland straight into disaster. Because this isn’t just a matter of swapping an American flag for a French or EU one on the tanks and planes meant to defend us. It’s replacing hard security with dangerous daydreams.
France’s military potential, often praised as a European exception, looks impressive only when compared to Europe’s overall defense collapse and to Bundeswehr soldiers running drills with black-painted broomsticks. But when compared with the United States, it looks like a local greengrocer next to a global supermarket chain. Yes, France does have nuclear capabilities. But fewer than 300 warheads amount to less than 5% of Russia’s arsenal and pale in comparison with the thousands of U.S. warheads.
More importantly, the American nuclear umbrella is integrated into NATO’s security architecture; its warheads and launch systems are deployed on allied territory. Additionally, this false alternative contains a fundamental flaw in logic. In public debate, we’ve grown so accustomed to repeating that Article 5 of NATO is not automatic and that the U.S. might not come to our aid if it’s not in its interest, that some people now assume, without evidence, that any new arrangement would automatically be better.
Setting aside Poland’s historical experiences with “security guarantees,” there is no basis for believing that a politically weakened Macron and a European Union mired in perpetual crisis could suddenly offer us something better than Article 5, collective in nature and backed by NATO’s structured and coordinated chain of command.
France vs. the USA
In a June 2025 analysis, the authors of Foreign Affairs highlight that both France and the United Kingdom, each possessing their own nuclear warheads, maintain in their defense doctrines that the decision to use nuclear weapons is a matter of “national sovereignty.” How strong, then, would such guarantees be, and would they not disappear with the end of the term of the politician who made them? Another issue is that neither of these countries possesses tactical nuclear warheads. What if Russia used such weapons “and the target was located on the periphery of the French or British nuclear umbrella?” Would Paris or London be willing to respond with “their own high-yield strategic warheads and risk total annihilation if the opponent responded in kind?”
The same dilemmas and asymmetries apply to conventional forces. France’s defense budget is projected to reach €67 billion, but only in 2027. That’s not even 10 percent of the current U.S. Pentagon budget. The expeditionary forces that France often boasts about number 15,000 soldiers, while as of March 2025, the United States had nearly 250,000 troops stationed abroad. As the war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated, Europe would not be able to cope without American contributions in key areas: air transport and aerial refueling, satellite intelligence and targeting systems, and an integrated command structure. Replacing these capabilities at the European level could take decades, and any timeline would likely need to be doubled, assuming Brussels bureaucracy were to take charge of the effort.
Perhaps Paris can afford to indulge in military fairy tales about a future European army, not out of idealism, but in pursuit of an EU budget flowing into its domestic arms industry. Poland does not have that time. And any Polish politician who, in exchange for recognition in European salons or other benefits, wants Warsaw to take part in this fantasizing is extremely dangerous.