Everything appears to be heading toward war in the Middle East. Iran is unlikely to meet U.S. demands. At most, it may once again attempt to deceive the international community over its nuclear program. Meanwhile, Donald Trump has already invested too much politically and militarily in resolving the Iranian issue to back down now without military action. The only question, writes Gazeta Polska, is what an American strike would look like and how Iran would respond.
The first U.S. threats emerged during the escalation of protests in Iran and their brutal suppression by the regime. However, the Americans did not strike immediately – not only because of insufficient forces in the region, but also out of concern for the safety of allies and partners. They would not have been able to significantly enhance their protection against Iranian retaliation. It is no coincidence that not only Arab states in the region, but also Israel, discouraged Trump from launching a swift attack. Yet with each passing week, the situation is changing. The Pentagon continues to deploy strike forces and additional air defense systems to protect its troops and allies. Additional elements of the THAAD and Patriot systems are being sent to U.S. bases in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This suggests that Washington anticipates serious Iranian retaliation and the possibility of a prolonged exchange of air strikes. Judging by the military potential being amassed in the Middle East, the Americans are not interested in a mere show of force. This time, it may be about delivering a heavy and, ideally, decisive blow to Iran.
Three of Trump’s Demands and the U.S. Armada
On January 30, Donald Trump declared: “A massive fleet is heading toward Iran, larger than the one sent to Venezuela. If we reach an agreement, that will be good. If not, we will see what happens.” The United States presented Iran with three demands: the permanent cessation of uranium enrichment and disposal of existing stockpiles; limiting the number and range of ballistic missiles; and ending all support for radical groups allied with Tehran across the Middle East. It appears that Iran may be willing to make concessions only on the first point. Even that, however, would be extremely difficult to verify. Meeting the other two demands would effectively mean Tehran relinquishing its status as a regional power.
At the end of January, Trump received from his advisers, including officials at the Pentagon, a list of options for attacking Iran. Among them is a powerful, large-scale bombardment of key state facilities and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – IRGC. Other possibilities include strikes on symbolic regime targets, leaving room for escalation if Iran refuses to end its nuclear program. Potential targets could include Iranian leaders, security chiefs responsible for the deaths of protesters during recent unrest, as well as facilities producing and storing materials linked to the nuclear program and state institutions. The optimal scenario would involve surgically precise strikes on military targets to minimize civilian casualties. Yet even such a scenario, while weakening Iran militarily, may not pave the way for regime change. Nor would it necessarily compel Tehran to meet U.S. demands.
In the Middle East, there are already at least ten large or medium-sized U.S. warships. These include not only the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, but also destroyers equipped with Tomahawk cruise missile launchers. The carrier hosts 64 combat aircraft – a formidable strike force that Iran, after its air defenses were decimated in June 2025, has little capacity to counter. On board the Abraham Lincoln are stealth F-35C fighters, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, a squadron of CMV-22B Osprey aircraft, and two squadrons of MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters. The strike group also includes the guided missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and three destroyers – USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., USS Spruance, and USS Michael Murphy – likewise armed with Tomahawk missiles.
In addition, the group includes Marine units ready to conduct special operations. Beyond the carrier strike group, additional destroyers armed with cruise missiles – USS Roosevelt, USS Delbert D. Black, USS Mitscher, and USS McFaul – as well as littoral combat ships USS Canberra, USS Tulsa, and USS Santa Barbara have arrived in the Middle East.
Air power is not limited to the Lincoln’s aircraft. The United States currently has dozens of B-52H strategic bombers in the region. In January, three squadrons of F-15E fighters were redeployed from the United Kingdom to a base in Jordan. Between 30,000 and 40,000 U.S. troops are stationed in close proximity to Iran’s borders. Approximately 10,000 troops are based at Ash Shaylia and Al Udeid in Qatar. Camp Arifjan in Kuwait serves as a key U.S. logistics hub for ground operations and hosts substantial armored units. American contingents are also stationed in Jordan and Iraq to protect borders and secure facilities. Marine units designated for amphibious operations are based at the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.
Iran’s Asymmetric Retaliation – Hormuz and the Axis of Resistance
What will Iran do in the face of a U.S. military campaign against the regime? “Trump talks too much, but we assure him he will answer for it on the battlefield,” said IRGC Air Force commander General Majid Mousavi. Judging by the rhetoric, Tehran is trying to deter a U.S. strike while signaling readiness to escalate if deterrence fails. Some regime decision-makers believe the only credible deterrent is the threat of a prolonged, costly war.
In terms of defending against air attacks, Iran is currently virtually defenseless. However, it still possesses an arsenal of several thousand short- and medium-range missiles powered by solid fuel, making them difficult to detect. These missiles pose a real threat primarily to smaller Arab states in the region hosting U.S. bases. Iranian forces also have cruise missiles and drones, which they would likely attempt to use against U.S. warships.
The most dangerous scenario would involve direct attacks on U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf – the clearest symbols of American military power. Iranian planners understand that this is an exceptionally risky and operationally complex option. Any naval confrontation would likely rely on the IRGC Navy’s swarm tactics doctrine: large numbers of fast boats armed with missiles operating from dispersed coastal bases to harass, encircle, and probe American vessels. In a high-intensity conflict, such swarms could be combined with naval mines and land-based missile fire to create a dense and disorienting threat environment designed to saturate U.S. defenses.
One of Iran’s most powerful retaliatory tools remains its theoretical ability to block oil transport from the Persian Gulf, where up to 40 percent of global oil production is extracted. Around 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passes through the narrow Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman, linking the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. For years, Iran has considered the option of blocking this route. In the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian navy has deployed Fateh-class submarines, accompanied by Ghadir-class mini-submarines adapted to the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. Their deployment represents a deliberate strategic escalation of Tehran’s asymmetric maritime doctrine, using underwater warfare to offset U.S. naval superiority.
Beyond maritime pressure, Iran would almost certainly seek to activate its regional network of allied armed groups. Although these proxies have been weakened over the past two years in confrontations with Israel – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – and with the Western coalition – the Houthis – they still provide Tehran with strategic depth and flexibility. This enables attacks on U.S. and allied interests while allowing Tehran to deny direct involvement. At present, Iraqi Shiite militias appear to pose the most serious threat, likely targeting U.S. bases in the region – a move carrying less risk of escalation than attacks on Israel or Gulf states.