“A state governed by the rule of law is recognized precisely by the fact that, even when very serious allegations are raised, authorities act strictly within the limits of the powers granted to them by statute. There is no implied competence to punish a judge outside the law,” writes Franciszek Michera, a judge of the Regional Court in Olsztyn, in a commentary for Niezalezna.pl regarding the scandal involving harassment of Judge Tomasz Koszewski.
As reported by Niezalezna.pl, efforts have been underway at the Regional Court in Olsztyn to break Judge Koszewski. For months, he has faced obstacles in performing his judicial duties, and last Friday he was informed that he would not receive his salary.
The Problem Is Structural and Statutory
The case of Judge Tomasz Koszewski should primarily be assessed in terms of the statutory limits of judicial administration. Publicly available information indicates that the workload of his docket had previously been adjusted by a resolution of the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa due to his role as deputy disciplinary spokesperson. That resolution provided for a reduction of incoming cases to 75%. Therefore, the court administration had no authority to simply declare that the resolution produced no legal effects merely because it did not accept it.
The Act – Law on the System of Common Courts does not grant a court president the authority to review the legality of individual resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary. A court president acts within the law—not above it.
This element alone should raise fundamental objections. A state governed by the rule of law does not function in such a way that administrative authorities execute only those acts they approve of based on their own systemic assessment. If the law provides a mechanism for resolving disputes over the allocation of duties, that mechanism applies even when its outcome is inconvenient for court leadership.
After Six Months of Absence, the Docket Should Be Redistributed
A key issue in this case is the failure to redistribute the judge’s docket after a prolonged absence. The Rules of Operation of Common Courts state in §63(1) that a docket must be reassigned if a judge’s illness or planned absence exceeds six months, unless a specific exception applies. The same provision allows for earlier redistribution after just two months if justified by backlog and the expected duration of absence.
This means that after six months of absence, the default approach should not be administrative inaction, but reorganization.
If, after such a prolonged absence, the docket was not properly redistributed, the judge cannot later be held responsible for a situation resulting from administrative inaction. One cannot first fail to implement the regulatory mechanism designed to restore order and then claim that the existence of a backlog proves persistent refusal to perform duties.
Moreover, a letter from the court president cites both a low number of resolved cases and the failure to schedule hearings for April and May 2026 as arguments against the judge. However, this ignores fundamental questions: What was the state of the docket after the absence? What reorganization measures were taken? Were conditions provided that met the standards of lawful and equal service?
Without answers, claims of culpable failure to perform duties are at the very least premature.
Equal Access to Assistants Is Not a Privilege
Another key aspect concerns assistant support. Under §80(8) of the Rules of Operation of Common Courts, the head of a division must establish a schedule for assigning assistants, ensure transparency, and guarantee equal access for judges—subject only to justified exceptions.
If one judge was deprived of real assistant support while others continued to receive it, and no objective and verifiable criteria were provided, this is not a neutral staffing decision. It constitutes a violation of the principle of equality in work organization.
Assistant support is not a reward for compliance or a tool of pressure—it is a structural element of judicial work.
Here, multiple threads converge: failure to implement the National Council’s resolution, lack of proper docket reorganization, withdrawal of assistant support, and finally using the resulting situation to justify withholding salary. This sequence cannot be viewed as a mere dispute over efficiency—it reflects a classic model of institutional repression.
The Court President’s Letter and Misuse of Labor Law
The most far-reaching element is the letter of March 27, 2026, from the President of the Regional Court in Olsztyn. It states that Judge Koszewski would not be paid his salary for March 2026 (except for a functional allowance), citing provisions of the Law on the System of Common Courts and the Labor Code.
This legal construction is fundamentally flawed. The cited provisions are organizational and supervisory—they do not authorize unilateral deprivation of a judge’s salary. The law provides specific and closed cases where judicial remuneration may be reduced or lost.
Crucially, reliance on Article 80 of the Labor Code contradicts the interpretation adopted by the Sąd Najwyższy in its judgment of April 15, 2021 (III PSKP 14/21). The Court emphasized that a judge’s right to remuneration is not equivalent to that of employees—it is constitutionally grounded and serves as a safeguard of judicial independence.
If court administration could arbitrarily decide on a judge’s salary, it would become a tool of pressure rather than a systemic guarantee.
Notably, the decision to still pay the functional allowance implicitly confirms that the judge was neither dismissed nor formally suspended—highlighting that a sanction unknown to the law was effectively created.
If There Were Allegations, Proper Procedures Should Apply
If court leadership genuinely believed that the judge persistently refused to perform judicial duties, the law provides a clear path: disciplinary proceedings. Article 107 §1 of the Law on the System of Common Courts explicitly regulates such situations.
There is no legal model allowing a court president to replace disciplinary proceedings with a self-imposed financial penalty.
A state governed by the rule of law is defined precisely by adherence to statutory limits—even in the face of serious allegations.
Criminal Liability and Broader Constitutional Context
In this context, potential criminal liability arises under Article 231 §1 of the Penal Code, which penalizes abuse of authority or failure to fulfill duties by a public official acting to the detriment of public or private interest.
If the publicly disclosed facts are accurate, the private harm would involve withholding due remuneration and worsening working conditions, while public harm would consist of undermining the statutory model of judicial functioning.
The case may also have broader constitutional implications. Given that the President of the Constitutional Tribunal has submitted a notification concerning possible serious offenses against the state system, this situation could represent part of a wider, coordinated mechanism undermining constitutional guarantees.
Conclusion
If the publicly disclosed documents accurately reflect the course of events, the case of Judge Tomasz Koszewski is not a routine administrative dispute but a clear تجاوز of the boundaries of lawful judicial administration.
Failure to implement the National Council’s resolution, lack of proper docket redistribution, unequal treatment in assistant support, and withholding salary outside statutory provisions form a coherent pattern of repressive actions.
Such conduct cannot be justified by organizational concerns or efficiency rhetoric. In a state governed by the rule of law, judicial administration is also bound by statute.
And precisely for that reason, this case stands as evidence of a breach of the limits of legality by court administration.
Franciszek Michera – judge of the Regional Court in Olsztyn, Deputy Disciplinary Spokesperson at the Court of Appeal in Białystok, academic lecturer at the Academy of Justice, and deputy spokesperson for the association Lawyers for Poland.