Donald Tusk’s recent policy address is widely interpreted as a symptom of a dysfunctional and incoherent governing coalition. This conclusion is increasingly drawn—even by mainstream commentators who have retained a modicum of reason and distance from the so-called December 13 Coalition. But the problem runs deeper. The liberal-post-communist project of the Third Republic is visibly decaying—the narrative that “all is well,” upheld by comprador elites as the guarantee of “development,” is becoming untenable. Tusk, at this point, is merely mouthing words.
On June 11, Tusk delivered a speech to a sparsely filled parliamentary chamber. Following Civic Coalition candidate Rafał Trzaskowski’s defeat in the presidential election, Tusk—head of the broader December 13 Coalition—opted for a bold maneuver to preserve his political project. There was no accountability (at least officially), no serious self-criticism. Instead, he forced a vote of confidence, compelling loyalty from increasingly disoriented coalition partners—New Left, Polish People’s Party, and Poland 2050.
Tusk as Lenin
The somber expressions on the government benches, the fatigue, and the quiet discontent among MPs revealed that the coalition’s minimum goal had become its maximum one: to cling to power, offices, and privileges for as long as possible. This is about prolonging the survival of a system on which not only political careers depend, but also the fortunes of business and post-intelligentsia circles that support the current government—sometimes overtly, often tacitly. This influence is evident across the media, cultural institutions, and the so-called third sector.
The fight for democracy and liberalism? It increasingly appears to be little more than a smokescreen, obscuring a dense network of interests orbiting around Tusk. The subdued, yet noticeable criticism following his second exposé speaks volumes: the leader of the comprador elite has failed to reassure his own ranks—if anything, he has deepened their concerns.
Grzegorz Sroczyński, writing for Gazeta.pl, noted that the Prime Minister’s address could have been omitted altogether—it clarified nothing and only heightened preexisting anxieties. This sentiment—though not always voiced openly—is echoed even by those inclined to wish the December 13 Coalition well. The central part of Tusk’s speech, delivered when most listeners were still attentive, was devoted almost entirely to attacking Law and Justice (PiS). Later, perhaps unconsciously, he resorted to Leninist rhetoric, promising to “catch up and overtake”—not the United States, as Lenin once proclaimed, but PiS. Nearly every initiative Tusk outlined was a continuation of policies begun by the United Right. No surprise, then, that the Prime Minister grimaced—barely concealing his discomfort—when Anna Maria Żukowska criticized him for lacking any political vision. She rightly observed that this had always been his greatest and oldest weakness.
This isn’t just about a lack of narrative. It points to a deeper, structural failure of so-called democrats and liberals to make the state function. That is their core weakness. Żukowska’s own post-communist party should not feel immune—this structural problem affects them as well.
The Liberal Elite Has No Plan
Tusk’s lack of a coherent strategy is not merely the result of poor political marketing or friction between coalition partners. The problem lies in the very philosophy and practice of governance in post-1989 Poland, dominated by comprador elites. In the 1990s, these groups built their fragile legitimacy on the radicalism of the economic transformation. A disoriented society—disillusioned with discredited socialist policies—was told, repeatedly and forcefully, that there was no alternative to shock therapy.
Although post-communist parties at times exploited nostalgia for the Polish People’s Republic to win votes, they did so in such a cynical manner that even this tactic eventually ran dry. The next grand narrative centered on EU accession, accompanied by major infrastructure projects that began to heal some of the wounds in structurally impoverished regions. Comprador elites benefited from this—as they did from the mass emigration of young Poles throughout the 2000s. But the comforting metaphor of “warm water in the taps,” favored by Tusk’s Civic Platform, quickly lost its appeal.
Contrary to the assurances of Tusk’s government and liberal media after the 2008 financial crisis that Poland remained a “green island,” society began to feel the strain: wages remained low, especially given increasing working hours; public services deteriorated; elites appeared ashamed of Polish identity; and people increasingly realized that the West meant not only free markets but also far more generous social support systems. The 2015 campaign of President Bronisław Komorowski epitomized the complacency and tone-deafness of the Third Republic’s elite.
It has now been more than a decade since the liberal-post-communist establishment had a viable plan for Poland’s development. They have had none since—and still don’t. Some may argue: but what about “the Constitution and democracy,” or civil unions and abortion rights? Yet even during the heyday of the “eight stars” movement, it was clear that this was a highly negative agenda, fueled by emotion and resentment. Its sole horizon was the removal of PiS from power. That, in essence, remains the December 13 Coalition’s only governing strategy to this day.
Mental Barriers
Why is this the case? The answer is complex, but one hypothesis may suffice: the comprador elites are mentally unable to overcome their own limitations.
The first barrier is their conviction that a quasi-feudal, exploitative socio-economic model is the most effective for Poland. Their rhetoric about “entrepreneurship” boils down to a state that steadily weakens, dwindling tax revenues, privatized profits for the few, and socialized losses that are devastating small and mid-sized towns. Tusk and his team continue to think this way. The left’s occasional scolding, despite being entangled in the same system, changes nothing.
The second limitation is the sheer derivative nature of the liberal-left establishment. They can—though not always successfully—implement EU directives and spend EU funds. Yet even this is questionable: Civic Platform’s first term saw highway construction marred by fiascos stemming from a “cheap state” mindset that prioritized cost over quality. Under EU—and particularly German—tutelage, during the cozy Merkel-Putin era, this approach functioned passably. The ship drifted along in calm waters. But the world has changed. Liberals and post-communists have failed to understand why citizens increasingly turn to so-called populism. This phenomenon is not some meta-political pathology, but a natural response to the disintegration of authority wielded by self-satisfied cosmopolitan elites.
On June 11, Donald Tusk mouthed words in parliament. Little more came of it. The real political momentum lies elsewhere now. It is our civic duty to help millions of Poles understand that in the autumn of 2023, they embarked on an experiment with the future of the Republic—an experiment far too dangerous to ignore.