At the UN forum, they engage in public disputes, yet more than a decade ago, Radosław Sikorski’s associates held behind-the-scenes talks with Russian diplomat Dmitry Polyansky. One result of these actions was the separation of President Lech Kaczyński’s and Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s visits to Katyn in 2010. Polyansky, a key figure during the era of the “reset,” has once again come into the spotlight after his recent speech at the UN Security Council.
During Monday’s emergency session of the UN Security Council, convened at Estonia’s request following violations of its airspace by Russian fighter jets, there was a heated exchange between Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski and Russia’s deputy UN ambassador, Dmitry Polyansky. Sikorski sternly warned Russia against further provocations.
“I have only one request to the Russian government: if another missile or aircraft enters our airspace without permission, deliberately or by mistake, and it is shot down, and the wreckage falls on NATO territory—please, do not come here to complain. You have been warned,” declared the Polish foreign minister.
In response, Dmitry Polyansky resorted to typical Kremlin rhetoric, comparing European leaders to “their predecessors, euro-integrators, Hitler, and Napoleon,” and insisting that “anti-Russian sentiment is the only glue holding the Union together.” He also rejected accusations of violating Estonia’s airspace, calling them “another act in the spectacle of blaming Russia for everything.”
A Key Figure of the “Reset”
Who is the man speaking so arrogantly on the international stage? Dmitry Polyansky is a seasoned Russian diplomat, born in 1971, a graduate of the Institute of Asia and Africa at Moscow University and of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. He speaks fluent Polish. From 2008 to 2011, he served as deputy ambassador of the Russian Federation to Poland. This was the period when Donald Tusk’s government pursued a policy of “reset” in relations with Russia.
As revealed by Sławomir Cenckiewicz and Michał Rachoń in the TV series Reset and the book Zgoda (“Consent”), Polyansky was one of the key figures implementing this policy behind the scenes. His name appears in numerous declassified documents from Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time.
Cooperation with Sikorski’s People
Polyansky maintained close and regular contacts with Jarosław Bratkiewicz, then director of the MFA’s Eastern Department, considered one of the main architects of the “reset” policy. Bratkiewicz, a graduate of MGIMO, authored a memorandum dated September 3, 2008, reporting on a meeting with Polyansky. The conversation took place shortly after Russia’s invasion of Georgia, and just before Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Poland, where he was received with full honors. After his discussion with Polyansky, Bratkiewicz wrote:
“Moscow considers the Russian foreign minister’s first foreign visit to a European capital after the events in Georgia as the beginning of a serious discussion on the future shape of Russia’s relations with the West. […] Lavrov’s visit to Warsaw, at a time when the French Presidency was actively working to settle the Georgian-Russian conflict, greatly enhances Poland’s authority among EU states in the process of seeking possible forms of relations with Russia after the events related to the Georgian-Russian war.”
The “Separation of Visits” in Smolensk
The most telling example of Polyansky’s cooperation with Sikorski’s people was the organization of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre.
On September 29, 2009, just weeks after Lech Kaczyński’s speech at Westerplatte—which disrupted the idyllic mood of reconciliation under the reset—officials from Poland’s MFA met with Dmitry Polyansky, then deputy ambassador of Russia to Poland.
“From my side, I expressed the view that a possible meeting of the Polish and Russian prime ministers in Katyn in April or May 2010 could serve to announce that the Polish-Russian historical research center had begun its work,” wrote Bratkiewicz in a general note from the meeting. Its addressees, according to the distribution list, included 23 people—among them Władysław Stasiak, head of the Presidential Chancellery and a close aide to Lech Kaczyński.
That very same day, however, Bratkiewicz prepared a separate memo with a different distribution list. Right in its opening sentence, he emphasized the sensitivity of the matter, admitting that alongside the first memo he had prepared a second one, including parts of the conversation with Polyansky requiring, as he put it, “greater discretion.” This referred primarily to the possible joint participation of the Polish and Russian prime ministers in commemorations of the Katyn massacre’s 70th anniversary.
“The interlocutor [Dmitry Polyansky] pointed out that the Russian side basically had nothing against such an eventuality. At the same time, it feared that President Lech Kaczyński might also wish to take part in this joint undertaking, since in Russia’s view, historical issues were more the domain of presidents than prime ministers,”
Bratkiewicz noted in the document, which was concealed from President Lech Kaczyński.
Thus, as early as September 2009, Polish diplomats had heard from the Russians that they feared the Polish president’s participation in joint Katyn commemorations. This information, however, was withheld from Lech Kaczyński. It marked the beginning of the actions later referred to as the “separation of visits” in Smolensk.
The Chechen Case and the Demand for a “Decisive Reaction”
Another example of Polyansky’s involvement in Polish internal matters was the issue of the World Chechen Congress, planned to take place in Warsaw in September 2010. In a conversation with Bratkiewicz, the Russian diplomat demanded a “decisive reaction” from the Polish side, warning that holding the congress could “trigger a major political scandal in Polish-Russian relations.”
It is worth noting that Polyansky did not ask Polish authorities merely to “refrain from participating” in organizing the Congress or to “avoid supporting” its participants. He demanded a “decisive reaction.” There is no doubt that this was tantamount to demanding the arrest and extradition of Akhmed Zakayev to Russia. Under Russian pressure, Zakayev was indeed detained in Poland on September 17, 2010. Ultimately, however, the Polish court refused to extradite him to Russia.