There has been no progress on the restitution of looted artworks, zero cooperation in matters of defense, and recently, the forced transfer of migrants. The December 13 coalition is having a difficult time dealing with our western neighbor.
And yet, this was not how things were supposed to unfold. Donald Tusk was expected to ride in on a white horse, showered with accolades for his courageous stance as a defender of democracy, having triumphed over the “populists from PiS.” Indeed, he was rewarded—most notably through the unblocking of EU recovery funds (KPO), which Poland co-finances and to which it is rightfully entitled. However, no tangible improvement in Polish-German relations has occurred. On the contrary, one could argue that the situation has worsened—despite numerous gestures of deference, not to say outright servility.
Not to Harm Germany – the Heavy Burden
A recent example was the cancellation of an academic conference on artworks looted by Germany, which was scheduled to take place in Berlin at the initiative of the Pilecki Institute. According to Rzeczpospolita, the newly appointed director of the Institute, Professor Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, justified the cancellation by claiming that “the timing of the Polish presidency of the EU is not appropriate for organizing a conference on a topic that could be uncomfortable for Germany.” As a result, research into the Sierakowski collection and other cultural artifacts lost during the occupation has been halted or delayed, drawing criticism from some academic circles and historical commentators.
In addition, a temporary monument was recently erected in Berlin to commemorate Polish victims of Nazism, located near the former Kroll Opera House. While the gesture, which seeks to prompt German reflection on their historical responsibility, seems reasonable in principle, the outcome is telling: despite years of advocacy, the result is merely a large, unattractive glacial erratic. The monument’s unveiling was attended by low-ranking officials, underscoring the lack of real progress in memory politics. Officially, the boulder is to remain in place no longer than two years—but in Polish-German relations, few things prove as permanent as so-called temporary solutions. We have already learned that lesson firsthand.
Germany: The Right-Wing Still Influences Tusk
In the context of Alexander Dobrindt’s recent visit to Poland, journalist Philipp Fritz wrote with disarming candor that “politicians of the national-conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) almost continuously accuse Tusk and his government of being too close to Germany. This compels members of the Polish government to either distance themselves from German policy or at least avoid publicly revealing any common ground with members of the federal government.”
Poor coalition politicians—how they would love to support their German “comrades,” but are restrained by the forces of nationalist reaction! Or perhaps the real obstacle to effective policymaking in Poland lies with these very same German “comrades” and their self-interest?
What we see here is a familiar mechanism: the political center naturally supports its preferred actors on the periphery. In normal circumstances, these actors are rewarded for their efforts—but they also deliver something in return to ordinary citizens. For instance, it cannot be denied that the communist era in Poland brought significant advances in industry, education, and infrastructure.
Likewise, for many years Poland benefited from its membership in the European Union. However, when the political center begins to experience crisis, it often starts treating its peripheral agents like tax collectors—tasked with extracting as much as possible from the population while remaining silent. Such an arrangement is not sustainable in the long term. Local elites face dual pressure: from an increasingly demanding center and from increasingly dissatisfied citizens. It is only a matter of time before this structure collapses.
Poland was fortunate in the 1980s to recognize the right moment to disembark from the ship called the “Soviet bloc” and to attempt a different course. We later joined the EU, which initially brought clear benefits. But now the road ahead is more complex. If we truly aspire to become a new Japan or South Korea, we must exit the train of “German Euro-imperialism” and pursue greater autonomy—without severing ties with our western neighbors or with the EU as an institution. If we succeed, there will be no systemic limits to the future development of our nation.