This is the time when the Christian world turns its thoughts to those singular, unique births in Bethlehem. It is also a good moment to reflect on how rare everyday births are becoming – the births of new Poles. The demographic catastrophe is not approaching – it is already here. Some will point to the policies of the new government as the cause, others will return to the issue of the great fear triggered by the pandemic, to the anxieties brought by living in the shadow of a war just beyond our border. Still others will recall the social transformations that first affected the wealthiest Western countries and then Poland as well. Everyone will be right, because we are dealing with a convergence of many factors. But can this process be reversed?
I believe it can, while also being convinced that to the various – usually quite valid – arguments pointing to the need for an active pro-family policy, one more component must be added, in my view a key one. Which one? More on that later in this text. First, however, let us take a moment to recall how we found ourselves in this crisis.
The causes of the demographic catastrophe
It is not true that the threat of demographic trouble is the result of phenomena that occurred only in the Third Polish Republic (III RP). Scientists from the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) were already warning about the depopulation of Poland at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. It is true, however, that after 1989 the worrying processes intensified. Usually three elements are pointed out. The first is mass emigration after the opening of borders, the second is economic hardship resulting from growing income disparities brought about by the economic transformation (let us not forget high unemployment and vast areas of poverty in the provinces). The third consists of socio-cultural changes similar to those that had earlier taken place in developed countries: the family model changed, acceptance of childless relationships increased, and the age at which young people entered adulthood was delayed. At the same time, Poland had and still has problems that are specifically… Polish – three and a half decades after the transformation, owning one’s own apartment (especially in a large city) remains a luxury good.
I am not writing this text to analyze in detail all aspects of the Polish demographic crisis, but to suggest one more issue for consideration. It cannot be captured in statisticians’ tables, yet in my opinion it is extraordinarily important. It binds with an invisible thread all the concepts for emerging from this crisis. And what are those remedies? Let us recall: the Law and Justice party (Law and Justice (PiS)) focused on financial assistance (the 500+ program, later 800+), postulated increasing the number of affordable apartments (this part of the program did not work out particularly well), and took care to expand access to nurseries and kindergartens. There is little point in commenting on the achievements of the current government – so far, its greatest accomplishment in demographic policy has been the closure of maternity wards. It turned out, however, that 500+ and other “plus” programs were more effective when it came to reducing social inequalities.
The brutal truth is that it does not look like Polish women will start having children en masse in the near future. There are, however, justified fears that negative demographic trends will intensify. We therefore hear: Poles must be encouraged to return from emigration. We also hear: an aging society needs hands to work, so let us save ourselves with immigrants. This is not, of course, about those migrants whom Vladimir Putin together with Alyaksandr Lukashenka are trying to push illegally across the Polish border, but about labor immigration framed by appropriate regulations. This change is already taking place, to a large extent as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the wave of emigration from Ukraine itself. Does Poland, however, have any coherent immigration policy? No, because immigration policy has become a hostage of day-to-day politics. Should it be urgently created? Of course. But it cannot be thought about seriously without a key element that so far has been omitted in various reflections on demography.
What do we need Poland for?
Here it is: before we begin to consider why Poland is needed by those who come to it and who might choose it, let us consider what it is needed for by us, Poles. From this point of view, we will see that the demographic crisis was built into the foundations of the Third Polish Republic (III RP) like an explosive charge, and from the very beginning of its existence a long countdown to the explosion began.
After 1989, Poles did not ask themselves a fundamental question: why does Poland exist and what, therefore, should it be like? Polish history continued by inertia; the transformation was not a new beginning but exactly what the word means: the toxic raw material that was the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) was used to build a new edifice. The building may look new, but the toxins remained. It is no coincidence that the anniversary of 11 November 1918 arouses such great spontaneous enthusiasm, while the anniversary of 4 June 1989 arouses so little. Meanwhile, a sober look at our history and at geopolitics, even in times of a temporary “end of history” (or, as others prefer, a “strategic pause”), would have forced Poles to return to fundamental truths. If they want to exist as a nation, if they want to have a future, Poland not only must exist, but must be strong. Either it will be a power (on its own scale), or it will not exist at all. There is no third way: it is not the idea of dissolving into some vague European identity, nor is it the concept of a German protectorate or a country associated with Russia. Here we arrive at a paradox that those who fight the idea of a great and strong Poland as exclusionary and nationalist fail to understand. Namely, it is precisely when the Republic of Poland is strong that it becomes a great attraction not only for those who want to enter into alliances with it, but also for those who want to be its citizens. Even burdened with numerous sins, the Second Polish Republic (II RP) radiated a light strong enough that Marian Hemar, a Jew from Lviv, said of himself that he was “a voluntary Pole”, not by conscription but by choice. This extraordinary power of Polishness meant that the son of a Saxon countess from near Berlin, Joseph von Unruh, became in adult life a great hero of the struggle for Polish independence as Józef Unrug, and when he capitulated to the Nazis he demanded that they speak to him in Polish, declaring: “I am a Polish officer and I have expelled the German language from my memory.”
Voluntary Poles
Poles will want to have children when they see a safe future ahead of them. Poles living abroad will want to return when they are guaranteed treatment not worse, but better than in foreign countries. And non-Poles will want to become citizens of the new Republic when it radiates economic, military, and cultural strength. They will want to be voluntary Poles when we guarantee them freedoms, provide equality before just law, and offer hope for a better future. And this means that first Poland itself must become a country in which freedoms prevail, just law exists, and there is hope for a better future for everyone who, accepting the rules set by the host, wishes to build such a future together with him. Instead of arguing about who opened more nurseries, let us think about who wants to build what kind of future and what kind of Poland. There we will find the key to demography.
Piotr Gociek – writer, columnist, critic, associated with the weekly Do Rzeczy and the portal Literacki.com.pl; host of the YouTube channel Piotr Gociek Zaprasza. His new book Milczenie Łazarza has just been published.