In a situation where the military threat to Poland from Russia is growing and the world is facing a nuclear arms race, Poland must adopt its civil-military atomic strategy to survive in the new nuclear era, writes Piotr Grochmalski in Gazeta Polska.
Almost every day brings shocking revelations about the scale of destruction of state institutions being carried out by Donald Tusk’s team. After the infamous special team appointed by Adam Bodnar’s circle to prosecute soldiers who defended Poland’s eastern border during the hybrid war waged against Poland by Belarus and Russia, came the Prime Minister’s threats against citizens protecting Poland’s western border from German services who are smuggling migrants into Poland on a large scale, migrants they want to offload. Tusk stated that the spontaneous, grassroots defence of Poland’s national borders by Polish citizens against the influx of illegal migrants was “particularly nasty.” He openly threatened:
“We will put a stop to this, I’m warning you again.”
An Immediate Challenge
All this is happening at a time when the military threat from Russia is growing, and the world is on the brink of a nuclear arms race. To survive in this new nuclear era, Poland must develop a comprehensive civil-military atomic strategy. Poland’s national security is undergoing change due to the global spread of threats and the decline of legal constraints. Vipin Narang, director of the prestigious Centre for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his colleague Pranay Vaddi warn in Foreign Affairs that the scale of nuclear challenges may overwhelm the United States. As they note:
“If the United States does not urgently prepare for the impending nuclear hurricane, it could find itself in a place it has never been: a situation in which China, North Korea, or Russia-acting separately or in concert-uses a nuclear weapon against a U.S. ally or even the U.S. homeland because Washington appears to be unwilling or unable to deter such an attack. The world has never lived through such a storm. For eighty years, U.S. strategists have successfully fought to prevent it from arriving. But it is now coming faster than anyone forecast, and complacency may be deadly.”
This accurate diagnosis has profound implications for Poland; we must be prepared for the prospect of nuclear chaos. And that requires a government willing to engage in serious strategic discussion. As Narang and Vaddi emphasise:
“This coming nuclear hurricane poses far-reaching challenges. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Washington will need to develop more, different, and better nuclear capabilities and begin to deploy them in new ways. Given the scale of the problem, nuclear concerns can no longer be treated as a niche issue managed by a small community of experts.”
This challenge also applies to Poland, especially considering the very real nuclear threat posed by its neighbour, Russia.
Narang and Vaddi assert that the matter is so urgent that “Officials at the highest levels of government will need to incorporate them into core defense policy in each of the major theaters of vital interest to the United States: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. At the same time, Congress will need to back an accelerated effort to overhaul the U.S. arsenal with significant funding and give the project urgent priority, to be able to address not just today’s changing threat environment but tomorrow’s as well. Above all, for the United States to effectively handle a highly volatile and quickly changing nuclear order, nuclear affairs must once again become a central part of American grand strategy.”
There is no doubt that Poland should demonstrate strategic initiative on this issue and propose to the United States a serious dialogue concerning its involvement, especially in the European context, in building nuclear security. This should pertain not only to the development of civilian nuclear energy but also to military and scientific nuclear cooperation.
However, it is an open secret that Tusk’s team has poor relations with the White House, which undermines the tremendous work done by the United Right government and President Andrzej Duda in strengthening strategic ties with the U.S. Much hope rests on continuing these efforts under the leadership of the new President of Poland, Karol Nawrocki.
Wasting Time Is an Act of Treason
Donald Trump managed to halt a conflict between Pakistan and India that could have escalated into the first nuclear war. It remains uncertain how long he managed to delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Russia continues to employ extremely aggressive nuclear rhetoric, aimed primarily at the countries along NATO’s eastern flank. It has also moved tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, near the Polish border, without provoking a symmetrical response from the Alliance. The speed at which nuclear threats are growing has prompted the U.S. to accelerate its actions drastically. As Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi observe:
“These multiplying threats have not just brought nuclear strategy back to the center of U.S. defense concerns; they have also introduced new problems. Never before has the United States had to deter and protect its allies from multiple nuclear-armed great-power rivals at the same time. LikeRussia, both China and North Korea may integrate nuclear weapons into offensive planning, seeking a nuclear shield to enable conventional aggression against nonnuclear neighbors. Moreover, there is a growing possibility that two or more nuclear powers-for example, China and Russia, or North Korea and Russia-might try to synchronize military aggression against their neighbors, stretching the U.S. nuclear deterrent beyond its means.Finally, the rapid erosion of nuclear guardrails, the diplomatic architecture that has for decades limited proliferation and brought security to dozens of countries under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has pushed some Asian and European allies to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. All this has happened in an era in which the United States’ antiquated nuclear arsenal has fallen into disrepair, with ongoing modernization efforts mired in delays and rampant cost overruns.”
Narang and Vaddi point out that Russia’s offensive nuclear strategy in Ukraine sets an example for China and North Korea. For Poland, however, it underscores a different truth: it is not enough to simply possess robust nuclear forces to withstand military pressure from the Kremlin. What is needed are credible guarantees of effective nuclear deterrence. Narang and Vaddi warn that the U.S. may be nearing the limits of its ability to provide a reliable nuclear umbrella to its allies. As they write:
“Amid these volatile developments, a number of nonnuclear states-including, for the first time this century, Washington’s own allies-are contemplating developing their own nuclear arsenals. For decades, a key pillar of American nuclear strategy has been extending the U.S. nuclear deterrent to at least 34 formal allies across two vast oceans, a responsibility no other power assumes. This policy was born not out of altruism but out of self-interest: the United States and its collective deterrent are stronger with the geography, capabilities, and political unity that allies provide. Fewer nuclear powers means fewer opportunities for nuclear use, a goal that has also allowed Washington to centralize alliance decision-making under its command.”
The End of All Rules
Before our very eyes, the legal frameworks limiting nuclear arsenals are collapsing; from the 1987 INF Treaty between the U.S. and USSR to the New START Treaty signed by the U.S. and Russia in 2010. Putin has withdrawn from several such agreements. The expiration of New START is also looming in 2026, which currently limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on intercontinental delivery systems. If no successor agreement is reached, the world will face a full-scale nuclear arms race for the first time in half a century. This time, however, both China and Russia would be expanding their arsenals simultaneously, undermining the security of the U.S. and its allies.
As Narang and Vaddi highlight, some countries that have thus far relied on the American nuclear umbrella are now openly exploring independent options. They note:
“South Korea-anxious about American abandonment-is now most likely to engage in nuclear proliferation, although some NATO powers could also be candidates. In Europe, the United Kingdom’s and France’s nuclear arsenals can compensate to some degree for reduced U.S. engagement. But these forces, even combined with additional nonnuclear capabilities, are not positioned to limit the damage that Russia can cause to allies and thus cannot credibly replace the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States. As a result, countries such as Poland or even Germany could decide to seek their own nuclear weapons if they become convinced that the United States is no longer willing or able to protect them. The advent of more nuclear powers, regardless of whether they are U.S. allies, would open a Pandora’s box that Washington has fought for decades to keep closed.”
Poland’s Security and the New Nuclear Geopolitics
All of this makes it an urgent necessity for Poland to become part of the Nuclear Sharing framework. Already a year ago, in issue no. 26 of Gazeta Polska (June 26, 2024), I noted that:
“Poland could enter Nuclear Sharing through a backdoor by leveraging its good relations with the U.S. If we continue to certify our F-35A aircraft for dual-capable missions [i.e., capable of carrying tactical nuclear bombs], then even a lack of consensus within the Alliance would not be an obstacle. Poland could certify these aircraft bilaterally with the U.S., significantly increasing the number of airframes available to SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], thereby strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence.”
Integrating the B61 nuclear bomb with Polish F-35A jets may prove easier and less costly than building nuclear shelters and associated infrastructure in Poland. This nuclear option, both for Poland and for other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, appears to be the most practical. The Netherlands, already a long-time participant in Nuclear Sharing, has demonstrated the deterrence-enhancing value of using the F-35A’s capabilities. On June 1, 2024, the country made history by becoming the first to officially assign its F-35A fighters to nuclear strike operations.
This option remains viable. It could be realised through Poland’s increased participation in NATO nuclear exercises such as SNOWCAT and Steadfast Noon.
According to analysts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)-one of the world’s most highly regarded think tanks:
“This would enable Polish policymakers to join in the full spectrum of supporting roles for such missions, including reconnaissance, air defence, suppression of enemy air defences, and integration of nuclear- and conventional-strike options. NATO could also designate several Polish airfields as potential Dispersed Operating Bases, which ordinarily do not host military aircraft earmarked for wartime use. These preparations are well known to Alliance members (as part of NATO’s Standardization Agreements) and can be conducted through a consensus decision among members or, if consensus is unachievable, bilaterally between Poland and the US.”
The IISS analysts are entirely correct. Should Berlin attempt to block Poland’s participation in Nuclear Sharing, the bilateral U.S.-Poland option remains a viable alternative, especially as it would enhance both Poland’s and NATO’s strategic flexibility. IISS notes that such preparations:
“Such preparations would offer NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) additional options for dispersing dual-capable aircraft in wartime and in near-war situations, which would complicate Russian targeting and potentially increase survival and sortie rates.”
Moreover, this formula could be extended to other Alliance members, for example, Finland. This nuclear option for Poland, and other NATO eastern flank countries, appears the most feasible to implement and does not preclude full-fledged participation in Nuclear Sharing in the future. However, if implemented by NATO or through bilateral arrangements with the U.S., it is unlikely that it would be announced publicly.
Poland as a Nuclear Power?
An increasing number of experts are seriously considering the possibility of Poland developing its nuclear arsenal. I have previously discussed in Gazeta Polska an in-depth article by Fabian Hoffmann, published in Internationale Politik in early January 2024. In it, the well-known military affairs specialist presented a scenario in which “Poland becomes a nuclear power.” Hoffmann argued that Warsaw is actively striving to join the Nuclear Sharing program. As he noted, “If Poland continues to insist on the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory, then Warsaw will likely have to develop its own nuclear weapons program.”
Serhii Plokhy, in his 2024 book Russia–Ukraine: The Greatest Confrontation of the 21st Century, revealed that the subject of a Polish nuclear arsenal had already been raised years ago in discussions with the United States. According to the American historian:
“A direct connection between the possession of nuclear weapons and the aspiration to join NATO became apparent in 1992, when certain Polish politicians suggested to their American counterparts that Poland would become a nuclear state if it were not accepted into NATO.”
In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, a prominent German analyst duo – Florence Gaub and Stefan Mair – consider Europe’s nuclear options and identify one possibility as the expansion of the group of European states possessing their nuclear arsenals (currently the UK and France) to include new countries. Gaub serves as Director of Research at the NATO Defence College, and Mair leads the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
In their assessment:
“Several major European powers, chief among them Germany and Poland, could theoretically acquire the technological capabilities and allocate the financial resources necessary to amass enough enriched uranium and ultimately develop nuclear weapons. But doing so would still take time-certainly enough time for a potential nuclear-armed aggressor such as Russia to carry out a preemptive conventional strike on enrichment sites and other development facilities. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, such a strike would have been unthinkable. Nowadays, hardly anything can be excluded. To mitigate that risk, France and the United Kingdom could “lend out” some of their nuclear weapons on a temporary basis. The incentive for Paris and London to go along with this plan and support the nuclear ambitions of their allies would be to achieve strength in numbers: even without joint control, multiple European nuclear powers could establish a greater level of deterrence than France and the United Kingdom can establish for themselves today. The United States, for its part, would at long last be relieved of the burden of protecting Europe, freeing resources for alternative uses. But if the benefits are of historic proportions, so, too, are the potential costs-especially the raised risk of provoking a conflict with Russia.”
Still, the authors concede:
“In practice, there is no obvious contender for the position of Europe’s third nuclear power. So far, only Poland seems to be weighing the option in earnest.”
A German Pretext?
It is difficult not to get the impression that the authors are using Poland merely as a pretext to more broadly address the issue of Germany acquiring its nuclear arsenal. They admit that, due to Europeans’ historical experiences with Germany, such a move would be controversial and would “trigger deep concern in neighboring capitals.” Therefore, they emphasise that “any move by Germany toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be imaginable only in close consultation and concert with other European states, first and foremost Poland, where a nuclear-armed Germany would cause the most apprehension.”
Nevertheless, it is increasingly evident that among German elites, the topic of building a separate nuclear arsenal is being explored with growing intensity. As Nina Werkhäuser noted in Deutsche Welle in March 2025:
“Two surveys, conducted in early March by pollsters Forsa and Civey, showed 31% and 38% of Germans were in favor of Germany arming itself with nuclear weapons. That’s still a minority, but has grown by several percentage points compared to a year ago.”
There is also a clear trend in German media aimed at generating public acceptance for the nuclearisation of the Federal Republic. It is highly unlikely that Donald Tusk would oppose Germany’s nuclear ambitions, and that, in turn, would prompt a radical reshaping of Europe’s nuclear geopolitical landscape.