If early elections do not take place, Poland’s cohabitation will continue for the next two years. For the “independence camp,” which defines Tusk’s rule as contributing to the progressive decay of the state, the matter is clear – President Karol Nawrocki must, during this time, remain the guardian of independence and sovereignty. What does this mean?
The damage inflicted on Poland in domestic policy and social life over the past several months is difficult to assess. One only needs to mention Tusk’s team’s servility toward Berlin and Brussels, or actions aimed at pushing Americans out of Poland and Europe (the bizarre “guidelines” of Radosław Sikorski for Nawrocki’s visit to the White House). But this period has been exceptionally destructive in all areas – let us recall, for example, the fortunately halted dismantling of the Pilecki Institute, the reset-driven turn in the intelligence services, the growing ideologization of Polish schools, and the multiplication of problems across many other domains.
Allies and threats
All of this means that it is now the President of Poland who bears a truly historic responsibility for building a parallel state architecture. Parallel – let us add – to all these harmful actions. And for seeking “statesmen” wherever they may be found. Perhaps even within the structures of today’s government.
But what about the particularly sensitive safeguards to which the President must pay special attention? Here we speak of strategic “links in the security architecture.” Prof. Andrzej Zybertowicz writes about these in National Security (BNN quarterly, published by the National Security Bureau). His analysis appeared just before Karol Nawrocki’s swearing-in as President of Poland and can be treated as a kind of “recommendation” from a decade-long presidential adviser. It also provides an interesting perspective beyond the “current politics” of media fights and mudslinging.
As indicated, Karol Nawrocki does not have it easy. He assumes office in a time of chronic instability of Poland’s political system and at the height of the struggle between “Solidary Poland and liberal Poland,” or, as some call it, the “Polish-Polish war.” Zybertowicz argues that the coming years (thus Nawrocki’s first term) will be marked by a series of global instabilities, intensifying tensions between powers (the U.S.-China rivalry), and other local threats – above all, Russian. These, beyond the specter of conflict, drive an arms race, including the digital race to dominate in the area of building super-artificial intelligence.
All this is accompanied by technological instability and the need for almost instant adaptation to changing standards – not only military but also administrative. Added to this is instability in other fields – from cultural changes affecting all of us, to unpredictable economic cycles and “butterfly effect” risks which – as the COVID-19 pandemic showed – can shake economies in unforeseen ways.
Layered upon this is the instability and unpredictability of political systems (collapsing political mainstreams before our eyes, widespread social tensions, or the rise of previously marginal movements – see AfD in Germany). Finally, there is the specter of armed conflicts and the unpredictable consequences of the AI revolution.
All of this makes Zybertowicz conclude: “The fears associated with the sense of ‘totality of change’ at all levels and in all areas of social life do not encourage strategic reflection.” And such reflection is necessary. Necessary because while cognitive paralysis may be unavoidable for individuals, the state cannot afford it.
Key areas
This is why Zybertowicz seeks to identify the mentioned “links in the security architecture” – safeguards that a responsible state must build:
- Intellectual sovereignty. This means having one’s own intellectual and expert capacity and continuously strengthening analytical potential (intelligence services, open-source intelligence, big data research centers).
- Societal and state resilience. The ability to carry out core functions despite shocks and losses. In practice, this is institutional antifragility – the ability to respond to crises, adapt to them, and manage them sustainably. We know this is a problem, given Poland’s inadequate handling of the migration crisis or, more recently, the lack of proper aid for flood victims.
- Possession of power: tools of hard, soft, and sharp power. The first two are obvious, but Zybertowicz introduces the third – “sharp power,” defined as the ability to fight in cyberspace and counter propaganda and extrastate influences (e.g., hostile activities by foreign-funded NGOs, as seen in election campaign meddling).
- Alliances. Networks of support that strengthen national capacity. Beyond NATO and the EU, it is crucial to continue developing regional formats (Three Seas Initiative) and seek external alternatives (South Korea).
- Diversification. A “strategy of risk dispersion and increasing systemic flexibility.” In practice, this is about energy security, diversification of arms supplies, and reducing the risk of bottlenecks, blackmail, or pressure from contractors.
Not with Tusk
Unfortunately, while thanking Prof. Zybertowicz for his analysis, we must note that many of the above aspects seem impossible to strengthen under the current government – indeed, they risk outright destruction. So what should President Nawrocki do under hostile cohabitation, when the government appears – to put it mildly – uninterested in building such resilience and, as the past months show, actively undermines it?
In such conditions, it is worth outlining areas where the President can pursue an alternative “survival” policy until cohabitation with Tusk’s government ends. An obvious tool is the veto power, which can permanently block destructive projects. This is already happening. The key, however, is that every veto from Nawrocki must be accompanied by clear reasoning, and, when needed, by presenting an alternative to the rejected project.
The same applies to legislative initiatives. Even if ignored by the government, they position the President as a strong participant in public debate. Here lies the space for expert-driven projects in areas such as cybersecurity, sharp power, defense, and strategic reserves. Even rejected projects create an “alternative” circulation of ideas (and force the government to respond). They allow not only for constructive criticism but also for putting presidential ideas on the agenda of expert and media debates.
The same goes for legal matters. The President can act as a guardian of the rule of law, request interpretations of legal provisions and treaties, or demand Constitutional Tribunal interventions. He can also publish further White Papers on key state areas. These do not burn.
For this to be possible, however, it seems necessary to build a circle of experts and active networks around the Presidential Palace. This should be done with greater dynamism than during Andrzej Duda’s presidency. At the same time, the President can shape soft power through campaigns, patronages, and initiatives carried out with independence-camp circles and other willing actors.
The changing world demands equal focus on areas such as AI and expanding civic education, supported by experts from BNN, the army, or friendly NGOs. Importantly, all this should be communicated constantly, ignoring the hostile influence of III RP media and without any complexes toward them.
One must imagine the Presidential Palace as a keystone for expert, pro-development, and patriotic circles that could “survive” the Tusk-era stagnation and design new development strategies – including a 2030 Constitution.
All hands on deck
Equally significant is the fact that a president with such a strong mandate and social trust, rooted “in the people” like Karol Nawrocki, can confidently move toward networking civil society, scattered across Poland until now. The role of fan communities, friendly Gazeta Polska Clubs, or smaller organizations (even Volunteer Fire Brigades) cannot be overstated. Their potential still seems underused. It is the President who can give them rank and “wings” in building a civil society resilient to crises – for example, by running educational campaigns about disinformation, offering first aid training, promoting crisis volunteering, and teaching security awareness.
All these actions serve a dual purpose. Besides building strong social bonds and a sense of the President’s presence in the life of the “ordinary Pole,” they also protect the aforementioned safeguards. They break apathy and keep the overarching project – Poland’s return to the path of development and security – on the agenda. What is needed for this? Simply put: the end of cohabitation…