Russian propaganda is one of the strongest and most effective weapons in Putin’s arsenal, and what’s worse, it appears to be achieving increasing success. These results, among other things, are from how quickly it can adapt to new conditions, evolve, and infiltrate various social and ideological spheres. This is visible in Poland as well, where its carriers – whether knowingly or not – include people representing completely opposing political camps. Yet, their narratives create a surprisingly coherent picture of reality, writes Dawid Wildstein in Gazeta Polska.
Let us begin by looking at two texts written by authors from the polar extremes of Polish politics: Colonel Mazguła of the Silni Razem movement and Łukasz Warzecha, a columnist for the right-wing magazine DoRzeczy.
Heroic Mazguła, Worried Warzecha
The recent piece by the latter is essentially the same story that the DoRzeczy circle has been trying to sell its audience for years, despite being repeatedly confronted with its falsehoods. It can be reduced to a single sentence: modern Ukraine is built on the foundations of Bandera ideology, crime, and the bloodiest genocidal nationalism, which it is only concealing for now – yet this is its true nature and goal. It is hard to count how many times this narrative has been shown to be false, whether to Warzecha himself or his colleagues (interestingly, in the same periodical, Piotr Semka dissected Warzecha’s text, revealing an extraordinary level of simplification and outright distortion on which it is based). Anyone familiar with contemporary Ukraine – how wounded and divided the state is – knows that reducing the identity of its nation to Bandera ideology is simply absurd. This, however, does not concern the DoRzeczy columnist. His message is clear – we should fear Ukraine and keep our distance.
At the same time, the “liberal” part of the internet is being flooded with stories about how brave and steadfast “liberal” Poles rescued someone from Ukraine from being beaten. Some of these stories are likely true. After all, aggressive racists do exist among Poles. Nonetheless, the sheer number of such “accounts,” their clearly political tone, and the “minor detail” that some of them are AI-generated show that what we are dealing with here are propaganda inserts.
A perfect example is the story told by the well-known Tusk fanatic, Colonel Mazguła, which unfortunately achieved extraordinary popularity online.
According to him, the Silni Razem hero, while driving through his village, suddenly came across two young, terrified, lost, and tearful Ukrainian women. It turned out that an evil Polish driver had thrown them off the bus they were taking to the West. The brave Mazguła, stirred by the honor of a communist grunt, caught up with the vehicle, stood up against anti-Ukrainian hate speech, and practically prevented a pogrom. He also called the Poles to order before riding off again, like a western hero, into the sunset. The story is so foolish, so nonsensical, that it is immediately clear it is fabricated. It contains no details enabling verification – not even the name of the transport company. Also typical of such fakes: the vague sketch of the “victims of terrible Poles” is intertwined with highly elaborate praise of Mazguła and his circle, and the claim that the real culprits are PiS, Ziobro, and the Catholic Church – because this is what the whole story is truly about, not the Ukrainian women.
For Brussels and for Moscow at the Same Time
Notice that despite their superficial differences, Warzecha’s narrative about Ukraine aligns with the way Mazguła describes Poland. The same thing is happening here as in the West – Russian messaging plays to both major sides of the political conflict, adapting at times to the emotions of the left and liberals, at other times to the right. Poles are meant to view Ukraine as a threat, and vice versa. Both states and nations are to perceive each other as enemies, divided so deeply that no alliance is possible.
Mazguła may even be a more valuable asset here, because he plays a double role. His ramblings irritate Poles who reject the pathology of Silni Razem, causing them to associate Ukrainians with such hatemongers. At the same time, we can be certain that he is being used to incite hatred among Ukrainians toward us – and if someone were to believe Mazguła’s tale, it is hardly surprising: two weak, lonely girls treated so brutally by Poles? Anyone would “see red.”
As for the goal, it is identical to the pro-Russian nonsense spread by Piątek, claiming that Kaczyński forced Putin into war, and by Sikorski and Giertych claiming that PiS planned the partition of Ukraine together with Russia. Ukrainians are supposed to see Poland not as an ally but as a potential threat, even if a “friendly government” is in power. They are to believe they cannot trust Poles or Poland, must remain constantly on guard, and treat us with maximum distance. The Mazguła case also shows that being a pro-EU worshipper of Brussels does not prevent one from spreading pro-Russian narratives in Poland.
The same applies to Leszek Miller, who, while defending virtually every idea advanced by Brussels, simultaneously spins narratives about Ukraine indistinguishable from Warzecha’s and similar authors – thus attempting to gain credibility on the right.
Somewhere between these two mutually reinforcing extremes lies a completely different type of pro-Russian propaganda, yet complementary to those described above. It is interesting because it relies on something entirely different – namely, it is explicitly apolitical. Its representatives emphasize, as much as possible, their distance from current conflicts. They do not want to take sides; they are tired of the dirty world of politics. Instead, they pretend they are here to address the problems of ordinary people and finally present “their” perspective.
What a Nice Belarus!
It is hard to say whether this last type of propaganda is not today the most dangerous, capable of infecting the perceptions of entirely normal people who have no emotional involvement in geopolitics. Superficially, it seems the most sincere, more genuine, and also less controversial. Not least because those who transmit this propaganda may do so unknowingly and without malevolence (which sets them apart from the earlier cases).
A colleague from the editorial team, Wojciech Mucha, recently recorded a podcast (on the portal Rynek Krowoderski) on this phenomenon, examining a travel YouTuber known as “the manager” from the channel Jak to daleko, Tomasz Jakimiuk. Jakimiuk recently traveled to Belarus and released a truly interesting recording from there. This YouTuber, skilled at capturing the absurdity and pathologies of the countries he visits on other continents, published a video whose main message was that Belarus… is nice. Because it’s clean, because the people are helpful, because it’s peaceful, and the food is delicious. As Mucha points out, the video contains several curiosities: Jakimiuk calmly films the headquarters of the Belarusian KGB – something for which any of us would be immediately detained – and even jokes about the danger, creating the impression that all the talk of oppression is exaggerated. What is most important, however, is his manner. As Wojciech Mucha notes, by repeatedly emphasizing that his video is not political, that it is about ordinary people and directed to ordinary people, Jakimiuk creates – perhaps unintentionally – a piece of material that is politically unambiguous. Its primary function turns out to be the normalization of brutal, dictatorial regimes, creating the impression that the stories about them are overblown, and that even if something bad does happen, it is only a marginal issue that does not affect the lives of “normal, peaceful people.” These people even love Poles, so perhaps we should not exaggerate our criticism of Belarus, so as not to alienate them. Let us remember that Jakimiuk is speaking about a state which, apart from its repression, is de facto a province of Russia and which, together with Putin, is conducting hybrid attacks against Poland…
The types of Russian propaganda described above, which aim to influence public debate in Poland, show us one thing: how many different forms pro-Russian narratives can take, including mutually exclusive ones, and how they are tailored to virtually every possible social group and political belief in Poland. All the more reason to carefully observe how it attempts to penetrate our own right-wing circles. One thing is certain – the stronger the right becomes in Poland, the more intensively it will be infected by Russian agents of influence.