Donald Tusk is trying to convince us that the agreements he has concluded with France and the United Kingdom – as well as the planned accord with Germany – will provide us with security. History suggests caution in such cases. The liberal global order is collapsing. We are entering a geo-economic reality in which no partner can be relied upon blindly, and no treaty, no matter how beautifully adorned with seals and signatures, can change that.
To be clear, alliances do have value, but not as the foundation of security. In today’s world, they function much like financial leverage in investing: they help strong states amplify their strength. For weaker states, they can create an illusion of security that may ultimately prove more costly than having no such illusion at all, because it dulls vigilance.
This was precisely the point made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth during the recent Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 in Singapore. Hegseth stated bluntly: “The era of subsidizing the defense of wealthy countries by the United States is over. We need partners, not protectorates.” As examples, he pointed to America’s Asian allies – South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia – countries that invest heavily in hard military capabilities and take responsibility for their own security.
By contrast, he criticized Europe for having “sat behind comfortable borders and neglected its militaries.” He also raised the bar on defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP, stating outright that 2 percent amounts to “freeloading.” Poland, which spends more than 4 percent of GDP on defense, fits perfectly into this narrative – one of the few reasons for optimism in the entire equation.
Europe’s hysteria
Meanwhile, discussions about Europe’s new security architecture are dominated by pervasive hysteria and the belief that the global order would be functioning perfectly if not for Donald Trump. Unfortunately, I bring bad news: not only would it not be functioning perfectly, but France and Germany may soon prove to be even more radical challengers of liberal globalization than the U.S. president.
The reasons why large segments of Western societies are rejecting liberalism are complex and extend beyond the scope of this article. Those interested can find a deeper explanation in my book Globalism, Localism and the New Middle Ages. Yet the complexity of the causes does not change the basic political facts. No firewall will be sufficient to stop this trend.
In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) currently leads in opinion polls. The country faces either a coalition including the AfD or a broad alliance of everyone against it – a coalition likely to be unstable and focused primarily on its own internal survival rather than on allies on NATO’s eastern flank.
In France, the next president may well be Jordan Bardella, the young leader of the National Rally, whom Marine Le Pen has already officially called upon to prepare for the 2027 presidential race. In the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage and Reform UK are increasingly emerging as the dominant force on the right.
Even if these parties do not immediately take power everywhere, centrist politicians will inevitably adopt elements of their programs. This is simply the law of political gravity. Those programs generally do not place great emphasis on alliance solidarity, and some even advocate seeking an accommodation with Russia – our principal strategic rival.
The theatrical outrage of Polish liberals toward the Polish right, expressed through remarks such as “you’ll get what you wished for,” is childish. Even if Poland were the most liberal country in the world, with a statue of Donald Tusk standing in every square beneath an EU flag, it would change nothing. We do not determine which political trend dominates Europe.
Of course, there is no reason for excessive alarmism. The European right advancing toward power – with some exceptions – does not intend to hand Vladimir Putin gifts or sacrifice all of Central and Eastern Europe for the sake of better relations with Moscow. Yet one conclusion is already clear: alliances alone are not enough.
A new version of the 1930s?
We are living in a reconfigured version of the 1930s, in which everything important has shifted somewhat eastward and expanded to a broader global scale. We face a powerful revisionist bloc consisting of China and Russia, with Beijing clearly acting as the senior partner. China has effectively stepped into the role once occupied by the Soviet Union as the global sponsor of revisionism, while Chinese capital and intelligence networks now penetrate Russia deeply.
The Kremlin is playing a game similar to that played by Nazi Germany before World War II: military escalation, border revisionism, and the gradual testing of Western resolve.
Germany, in turn, resembles what France was to Poland in the 1930s – potentially a very strong ally, but politically divided, uncertain of its direction, shaped by decades of pacifism and years of cooperation with the Russian Federation. The enormous sums Berlin now intends to spend on the Bundeswehr may either dissipate with little effect or become the foundation of a newly assertive German nationalism.
The United Kingdom today has limited military significance in continental terms, while the role of Europe’s dominant maritime power – once held by Britain during World War II – has effectively been assumed by the United States. Unfortunately, Washington is now preparing to reduce its military footprint in Europe, even though it continues to support Warsaw.
In such circumstances, Poland, much like before World War II, cannot fully rely on anyone. This does not mean treaties are worthless. They still provide certain guarantees and political commitments that may – though need not – prove decisive in a moment of crisis.
Unfortunately, even the regional alliances in which we have long placed our hopes – the Bucharest Nine, the Three Seas Initiative, and the Nordic-Baltic Eight – may prove insufficient. It is difficult to build a strong Intermarium without Ukraine, the region’s leading military power. Yet recent experience has offered a sobering lesson regarding how Kyiv views regional cooperation and partnership.
Building our own strength
The foundation of Poland’s security must therefore be its own capabilities. Finland’s model of total defense offers an example worth following. Finland has created a system in which national defense is the responsibility of the entire society. Military service is compulsory for men, lasting between 165 and 347 days. The country maintains a reserve force numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and its comprehensive security model is based on deeply institutionalized cooperation between the armed forces, government, local authorities, industry, and citizens.
What distinguished Finland in 1940 was not paper alliances but a genuine willingness and ability to defend its own territory.
Sweden’s example is also instructive. The country has reintroduced conscription. Israel provides another model – a nation that has lived for decades under constant existential threat, yet has built formidable defense capabilities: a highly innovative defense industry, one of the world’s most battle-tested militaries, and, as is increasingly discussed in Poland, a readiness to employ unconventional means when necessary.
The restoration of conscription, the development of a strong domestic defense industry, and cooperation with the United States in the model that Hegseth described as a reward for “model allies” – this is the path Poland should follow.
The era of comfortable politics, conducted by pleasant politicians in calm and predictable circumstances, has come to an end.