Last week saw a meeting that electrified the political world and shattered the last remnants of dignity among several popular commentators. At Adam Bielan’s apartment, at around the same time, the following figures appeared: his former friend Michał Kamiński, now a senator affiliated with PSL; Speaker of the Sejm Szymon Hołownia; and most notably, PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński. This meeting became fertile ground for speculation. What was discussed? We can only guess and choose whether to believe the scattered pieces of information. It was probably about more than just the swearing-in of Karol Nawrocki.
Let’s recall what happened 31 years ago. After the semi-free elections, General Czesław Kiszczak was preparing to form a government with the participation of the PZPR’s satellite parties — the Democratic Party (SD) and the United People’s Party (ZSL). But then came a sudden twist. In early July, Gazeta Wyborcza published a groundbreaking piece by Adam Michnik titled “Your President, Our Prime Minister.”
A Shift — and a Subsequent Political War at the Top
The idea seemed far-fetched, and perhaps a bit naïve in Michnik’s style. The Solidarity camp was to join forces with reformers from the communist bloc. The communists would retain the presidency; the former opposition would take the prime minister’s office. Although this proposal soon turned out to be a trap — since the premier had to oversee unpopular reforms — at the time, it felt like a dream come true for many. Within a month, alliances shifted again and Lech Wałęsa appeared alongside ZSL and SD leaders. Behind-the-scenes maneuvering, in which Jarosław Kaczyński — then a key figure in Wałęsa’s circle — played a crucial role, led to the formation of the Mazowiecki government.
What followed — how Mazowiecki disappointed Wałęsa, and later Wałęsa disappointed the Kaczyńskis — is well known. Still, this doesn’t change how skillfully Kiszczak was stripped of the mandate to form a government in the summer of 1989. Could a similar scenario play out today, with Tusk in the role of Kiszczak, Poland 2050 as the modern-day SD, and ZSL being — as always — ZSL, albeit now with a “P” in its name? And what would the cost be for PiS and for Poland?
Until recently, such a scenario seemed impossible. And even now, it’s far from certain, given the resistance among many potential participants in this political game. Poland 2050 is full of politicians who appear closer to Donald Tusk than to Szymon Hołownia, and they’re not shy about it. This has caused tensions, such as the suspension of Tomasz Zimoch from party membership. PSL, too, has no shortage of open PiS opponents. In both parties, there are many figures who would find any form of cooperation with PiS difficult to imagine. Moreover, some are deeply compromised by their own roles in the December 13 coalition — people like Paulina Hennig-Kloska or Mikołaj Dorożała from the Ministry of Climate and Environment, or Ryszard Petru, now head of the parliamentary development committee and a Poland 2050 MP. That’s why even a technical government, not officially branded by any party, would still carry political costs for its participants.
Tusk Politically Weaker Than Ever
Despite these complications, the scenario is no longer off the table — and that’s due to Donald Tusk himself. Tusk is now at his politically weakest since returning to Polish politics. The triple blow of the presidential election (Trzaskowski’s loss, Tusk’s role in that defeat, and his isolation in pushing the narrative of election fraud) has left him significantly diminished. Yet he is acting toward coalition partners as if he were still in a position of strength. He announced a government reshuffle that would actually weaken his standing. Simultaneously, through loyal media outlets, he launched fierce attacks on Szymon Hołownia and Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz. The attacks on the minister of regional policy resembled the way Tusk pushed Zyta Gilowska out of Civic Platform years ago.
Meanwhile, Hołownia remains under prosecutorial scrutiny. PSL isn’t facing the same intensity of problems, but it sees what’s happening to its former Third Way partner. Ironically, the main argument against cooperating with PiS — its treatment of coalition partners — is now mirrored in KO’s behavior. The second barrier was fear of a media lynching, but that’s already underway. Thus, Tusk himself seems to be cracking open doors that were previously shut. And external players — powerful ones — may also be pushing for a change in government, likely making phone calls to their contacts in Poland and suggesting which new political arrangements they would welcome — or fear.
At the western border, Poland has effectively lost territorial control. The actions of its security services leadership are directly aligned with German immigration policy. For the first time since World War II, Poles near the border are being barked at with short, sharp commands by people in German uniforms. One couldn’t ask for a more symbolic image of a policy that boils down to a chilling “Für Deutschland.”
Risks of a Potential Political Marriage
Meanwhile, the economic data continues to deteriorate — hurting not only the business community, which is theoretically close to Platform, but also the working class, particularly the young, whom Platform has always ignored. These are just two of many arguments for immediately removing a prime minister whose thirst for revenge and dependence on Germany prevent him from pursuing any policy beneficial to the Polish state. However, as mentioned, any such change involving both PiS and parts of the current ruling coalition would come at a steep cost. Questions about accountability would remain — likely affecting only a few major KO figures, such as Roman Giertych, Adam Bodnar, or possibly even Donald Tusk himself.
There’s also the matter of Poland 2050 politicians whose performance in Tusk’s government sparked widespread backlash among experts and those concerned with their areas of oversight — climate policy, protected areas, forests, and hunting. Continuing their agenda is not only socially unacceptable but would be politically toxic for PiS. Moreover, PiS runs the risk of losing credibility among voters for whom such a compromise would seem deeply unpalatable. This would boost forces to the right of PiS — assuming, of course, those forces remain outside the new arrangement.
Politicians from both PiS and the presidency (Andrzej Duda and Karol Nawrocki would have to sponsor such a political shift to some extent) face an extremely difficult, even dramatic, decision — reflective of Poland’s dire situation. Of course, the most likely scenario remains a different one: Tusk’s government limping along, forced to persist by lower-level party structures, with the state continuing to rot from within. That could pave the way for a crushing right-wing victory in the next election — but the question remains: how much of the Polish state will be left by then?